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Abstract 
This dissertation is an introduction to machine learning techniques for malware detection 
and classification. 
The first chapter describes the past and current status of malware analysis providing basic 
definitions and input from the respective literature. In the second section the various types 
of malware, which can disastrously affect a Microsoft Windows operating system are 
presented. In addition, with an explanation and an introduction to malware detection and 
its techniques are described. The third chapter identifies and describes the role and the 
goal of artificial intelligence in malware detection and more precisely deep learning in 
malware detection. After a discussion of the malware detection’s goals, an explanation of 
clustering and classification algorithms used in the dissertation will be presented along 
with the respective theoretical background. In chapters four and five the experiment set 
up will be presented along with the respective data sets and the expected outcomes of the 
research. Also, the results from every category of testing (classification and clustering) 
will be presented and discussed. Finally, conclusions that were raised from this disserta-
tion, potential improvements and expansions of the tools made will be submitted in chap-
ter six. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Current Situation 
The Internet, nowadays, plays a crucial role in our everyday life. It has become an enor-
mous information and communication network making people do transactions and inter-
actions having thus a growing and increasing global market. While the Internet is grow-
ing, services like web banking, e-shopping, communication through the internet and so-
cial media are available to people for everyday tasks. On the other hand, there are people 
that are determined to enhance themselves by imposing novice users that perform trans-
actions using the Internet. Malware is now a program that helps people with malicious 
intentions to accomplish their goals. 
One of the most significant and largest vulnerabilities found, was the Heartbleed-bug, 
announced in Codenomicon 2014 [1], a bug discovered in the Transport Layer Security 
(TLS) heartbeat function. This vulnerability enabled attackers and criminals to exploit 
this vulnerability, therefore, allowing access to web application memory, where potential 
usernames and passwords, emails, and business critical documents could be stored .  
Malware and malicious software are developed, programmed and registered every day. 
In agreement with Symantec’s documentation about Ransomware and Businesses, [2] one 
of the most recent threats for the organizations and businesses is the ransomware Cryp-
towall, which locks and encrypts all the programs and files of the infected system, 
prompting groups or regular users to pay usually in bitcoins in order the information sys-
tem to be unlocked. 
There will always be threats and vulnerabilities, which malware developers and criminals 
will exploit. Therefore, it is important for security companies to detect the malicious pro-
grams and notify businesses and users about potential vulnerabilities. In line with the 
exponential growth of the Internet, the number of new malware is increasing every day, 
which has become difficult to analyze manually. 
 -9- 
 
Analyzing the increasing number of malware requires a lot of human resources if done 
manually. As of 2015, the AV-Test Institute, [3] registers 390,000 new malicious pro-
grams every day, which is infeasible to analyze manually. Even more, the malware should 
be divided into groups or families to which their code and behavior correspond to.  
 
Figure 1: AV-Test’s Sample Collection Growth up to 2008. [3] 
 
Current malware development procedures are focused on stealing sensitive data from 
everyday users and, to a more severe extent, they target critical infrastructures. There are 
many ways to get infected with malware. Some of them include social engineering ap-
proaches that try to deceive users and make them click e-mail attachments. 
It is well known that everyone that has an email account has dealt with spam at least once. 
However, the problem of spam is not always defined as irrelevant content and lack of 
bandwidth but also is a method to spread malware. Usually, spam emails are using a 
method known as driven by downloads because they want to make people click on links 
to websites which cyber criminals have infected with malicious code or open documents 
that again contain ransomware. This method is also known as spear-phishing attack. On 
the other hand, there is phishing that comes from spam messages also. Phishing’s goal is 
to redirect their targets to fake websites from which confidential data is then collected. 
The malicious software being developed and programmed by intruders, attackers and 
criminals is polymorphic and has various evasion techniques, meaning that they tend to 
have the code in such way that they are not detected by intrusion detection systems and 
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antiviruses. In other words, they use obfuscation techniques reducing the effectiveness of 
static analysis. Moreover, the different amount of their variants extremely concludes the 
influence of established protections which usually use static analysis methodologies and 
approaches and are unable to detect the previously unknown malicious binaries. The var-
iants of malware have in common usual behavioral models reversing their source and 
intention. Static and dynamic methods retrieve and acquire behavioral models and proce-
dures that can be later used to implement algorithms for detection and classification of 
unknown malware into recognized malware families using machine learning.  
To tackle this problem, researchers have suggested static and dynamic analysis techniques 
and procedures, which depend on the observation of the behavior of the malware pro-
gram’s activities for detection and classification. 
1.2 Static Malware Analysis 
Sikorski & Honig, 2012 on their book Practical Malware Analysis [4] and in accordance 
with [5] and [6] state that:  
Basic Static Analysis proposes the examination of an executable file with malicious in-
tentions without viewing the behavior and the instructions on what it does. This method, 
determines if a file is malicious, and provides information about its construction as well 
as its unique signature. The basic static analysis is performed using specific software, 
which has several disadvantages when performed on more sophisticated malware. 
Advanced Static Analysis proposes the method of reverse engineering. It is the way of 
revealing malware’s binary and assembly language by feeding the binary into a disassem-
bler, decompiler, and debugger and looking at binary’s source code and assembly code 
to find out services and activities of the executable. So, that way there is a determination 
of what the program does step-by-step. It is the most challenging and promising part of 
Static Malware Analysis as solving the assembly behind the malicious software requires 
disassembly, programming, and specific knowledge of how Windows and Linux(An-
droid) operating system performs.  
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1.3 Dynamic Malware Analysis 
Sikorski & Honig, 2012 on their book Practical Malware Analysis [4] and in accordance 
with [5] and [6] state also that:  
Basic Dynamic Analysis proposes and offers the opportunity of testing, executing and 
running malicious code and examining on the system to check its behavior, processes and 
potentially erase the infection. However, it should be mentioned that it is crucial to set up 
a virtual environment or virtual lab that will let a researcher to study the executed malware 
without damaging the actual information system or network. Even though typical dy-
namic analysis is a part of the malware analysis, it has some drawbacks, so the advanced 
method of dynamic analysis is required. 
Advanced Dynamic Analysis employs a disassembler to examine the internal condition 
and the procedures of an executed malicious file. This technique provides an approach to 
acquire more detailed data from a malicious program. Similar methods are valuable for 
obtaining information. 
There are two methods for dynamic malware analysis that can be introduced and pro-
posed: 
• Examining the dissimilarity between specified states: On this occasion, there are two 
states. The first state is the infection of the malware and the state after the infection. It is 
crucial to know how the information system was in the first state to be able to extract 
information about the malware while it is running. Finally, a report of the states compar-
ing each other of the behaviors of the malware are presented. 
 
• Monitoring running activities and services: Where, malicious programs executed are 
observed. More details what a researcher examines and finds through a dynamic analysis 
procedure.  
• RAM analysis: There are times that malware does acts like buffer overflow, or 
tries to find ways to access individual processes through RAM. 
• Files modifications: It is important to have a list of all system files before the 
actual infection of the system. There are malware that change or delete files. So 
keeping a list allow us to realize which files have been added, deleted or modified. 
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• Processes and system services: The aim is to detect if new services or procedures 
have been started or if something changed to processes that are already running. 
For example, recent evidence suggests that most of the times malware try to by-
pass any antivirus program that is on their way. 
• Systems changes: These modifications happen in registry so while investigating 
registry and log files an examiner can discover the purpose of this malicious file 
• Search for weird URL destinations: As analysts monitor the network, they try 
to find evidence that may lead to malicious websites, so unknown IP addresses 
should be checked through sites like virus total, sucuri and more. 
However, dynamic analysis of malware must be performed in an environment that re-
searchers are willing to sacrifice, and that is logically partitioned from other hosts on 
network (and, hopefully, the rest of the world). A reasonably complete overview of the 
behavior of a Windows program can be achieved by just monitoring its interaction with 
the file system, the registry, other processes, and the network. 
Both of the above techniques have their advantages and disadvantages. The static analysis 
suggests a full inclusion and report, but sometimes it suffers from code obfuscation. The 
binary file should be processed accordingly before examination with a common technique 
called unpacking, having as a result to make researchers encounter unmanageable com-
plexity during the analysis. Dynamic analysis is more useful and does not need the binary 
to be unpacked or decrypted. On the other hand, it takes time and consumers computing 
resources, so it raises scalability concerns. Furthermore, there are many malicious activ-
ities that might be without monitoring because there is no such a state or situation in order 
to generate the appropriate circumstances. 
This dissertation takes a totally different path to characterize, label and analyze malware. 
In more general terms, a malware executable can be depicted and described as a binary 
string of zeros and ones. This vector can be modified into a matrix and exported and 
converted into an image. Nataraj et al., 2011 suggested an approach and methodology 
where meaningful and relevant visual similarities exist in image structure of malware and 
can be used to classify them to their known malware families. Existing classification 
methods require either disassembly or execution whereas our approach does not require 
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any of the two but still shows significant improvement regarding performance. Finally, it 
is also resilient to favorite obfuscation techniques such as section encryption.  
2. Malware 
2.1 What is Malware? 
According to [5] and [6] malware is a program that has malicious intentions and it is made 
and designed for a certain purpose, to acquire access to an information system without 
the administrator's authorization. With more simple words malware is a software that 
helps an attacker complete and fulfills his malicious and crime intentions.  
2.2 What is Cleanware? 
Cleanware is that kind of software whose activity is not considered malicious. It is im-
portant to separate malware from clean ware, to ensure that an unknown file, is not mali-
cious.  
Examples could be: 
• Opening attachments in an E-mail. 
• Inserting an exterior hard drive or a USB stick to your system. 
• Background detection on computer. 
• Downloading a file. 
2.3 Behavior-based Detection 
On behavior-based malware detection, researchers analyze the malware and its behavior 
during run-time. The reason that sometimes there is a need to use behavior-based detec-
tion is to know the actual source code of the malware. Here the source-code can execute 
different code obfuscation techniques e.g. packing their code, polymorphism, and meta-
morphism.  
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2.4 Signature-based Detection 
Signature-based malware detection commonly refers to static analysis, where the mal-
ware sample is analyzed and unique signatures are extracted. These can then be used to 
distinguish malware files from good data and is a commonly used method by AV-ven-
dors. The problem arises when dealing with code obfuscation techniques employed by 
the malware. Some of the obfuscation techniques used against Signature-based Detection 
are listed below: 
• Packing: Adam Kujawa on a Malwarebytes 2013 Threat Report [8] informs that when 
malware developers pack malware, it means that it is compressed into a binary file, in a 
way it is understandable only if correct decompression is used or reverse engineering 
techniques and it is used to bypass anti-viruses, firewalls and more. When unpack is done 
or decompression, the malware is loaded into memory in a human readable form. Mal-
ware can be compressed in many ways and even several times making it close to impos-
sible to reverse-engineer the code. As recently has been presented at a Black Hat confer-
ence as a presentation [9] 
• Polymorphism: It is the method where the malicious software has a part of its code 
changed after every iteration it runs on the computer, while another part remains the same. 
• Metamorphism: It is the method that all the code of the malware is changed while it 
runs on an information system, but functionality is still the same. 
 
Figure 2: Malware Development [4-6] 
 
2.5 What is Classification and Clustering? 
Classification is a technique under which an object needs to be identified and be catego-
rized to a class by scientists. This dissertation provides predefined and known types, la-
bels and categories which separate this definition from that of clustering. 
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As the amount of malware samples are huge, it is easily understandable that humans are 
slow classifiers, so there is a need to automate the classification processes. 
The goal of classification in the field of machine learning is to present as a map new input 
variables or samples after training to a discrete output variable or label. To perform this 
generalization task, the classifier, often represented as a black-box module, is first trained 
using a set of labeled input/output data. Plenty of models exist to represent classifiers. 
Among them, the most popular ones include decision trees, the naive and general Bayes 
classifiers, random forest, artificial neural networks and other kernel related techniques.  
In data science outlier detection is the labeling of unknown information and data such as 
features, incidents, attacks or activities and services which do not belong to a known 
group and cluster in a dataset. More often the data for an anomalous detection system 
are from malware, botnets, etc. Three types of anomaly detection procedures and ap-
proaches exist. Unsupervised, Supervised and Semi-supervised anomaly detection tech-
niques. An unsupervised procedure detects outliers in an unsupervised dataset by mak-
ing the hypothesis that the majority of the data inside the dataset are reasonable and it 
looks and searches for any data that does not fit to the remaining dataset. A supervised 
technique has a dataset that is already labeled as” normal” or” abnormal,” and it is used 
to train a classification algorithm to be subsequently used to detect new and similar 
threats. Finally, in semi-supervised a framework is presented where normal behavior 
from a given normal training data set is trained, and then the probability of a test supple-
ment is tested and generated by the learned model. The most important anomaly detec-
tion techniques that have been introduced by the literature is Density-based techniques, 
classification and cluster algorithms (k-nearest neighbor, local outlier factor), support 
vector machines, neural network and computational intelligence and fuzzy logic. 
 
2.5.1 Artificial Neural Networks 
This dissertation considers Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) algorithms, which can be 
linear or nonlinear parametric models. These types are motivated by biological neural 
networks where neurons are computational units which are activated by weighted con-
nections (axons and dendrites). ANN are broadly studied and applied in engineering and 
sciences, especially in pattern recognition. They mainly yield accurate results when ap-
plied to regression and classification problems. 
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2.5.2 Classification problem for detection 
The classification task in data processing entails separating data entries into groups by 
assigning them a specific class (or type). The classification problem can be encountered 
in almost any field of work and there exists a large variety of approaches to find a solution. 
Some approaches worth mentioning are the decision tree models, the Bayesian classifiers 
(naive and general), support vector machines where the classification task can be divided 
into two subtasks. The first one is often referred to as the learning phase when the classi-
fier is created from a set of labeled input/output cases. The second step is often referred 
to as the testing phase where the classifier is tested on a set of labeled input/output cases 
not yet encountered during the training period. Once the model built in the two first phases 
is functional, it can be used to estimate and predict the output class for new and unlabeled 
input values.  
2.5.3 Classification problem statement 
The classification problem is easy when the data entries are linearly separable (i.e. they 
can be separated by a hyperplane). However, it is slightly more difficult when they are 
not linearly separable. In this case, the data have to be represented using a nonlinear 
model. 
2.6 Malware Families 
A malware family can be considered as a group of malware, whose main source code is 
the same ,that has similar main functionalities, but only their behavior is changed. That is 
the reason why sometimes new malware are referred to as variants or updated versions of 
old ones by industry and researchers. For classification, an emphasis is placed on the 
original and same main features and behavior of the malicious samples even though they 
might have different practices in general.  
In 2014 Microsoft recorded and registered in its database more than 236 malware fami-
lies. The reason researchers need this registration and have many families and classes is 
that having more samples means that they have more features for supervised learning 
providing better results and can focus more on the performance of their algorithms. So, 
having a database recording these samples could be a benefit for any examiner.  
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2.7 Naming Malware 
According to Microsoft [10] a malware with specific behavior can have more than one 
names from AV Vendors because they use different methods and ways to call malware 
and it depends on the number of samples that they collect as well as their particular be-
havior. One of the most common methods for calling malware samples is the CARO 
Naming standard. 
CARO is an informal malware naming scheme developed by individuals from AV com-
panies and researchers. Note that the CARO naming convention does not solve the prob-
lem of ambiguous class labels, but instead, tries to address the inconsistent labeling. 
The idea is to create a universal standard, or syntax, for naming malware, to prevent con-
fusion of definitions among , say. AV-vendors and users. The most complex form is as 
follows: 
<malware type>://<platform>/<family name>. <group name>. <infective length>. <sub-
variant><devolution><modifiers> 
All conventions are optional except for family name since not all entries are necessarily 
available. 
This protocol is used by Microsoft in their AV software namely, MSE or the Win8 ver-
sion, Windows Defender. For MSE, the scheme used is as following: 
<malware type>://<platform>/<family name>. <sub-variant>! <vendor-specific com-
ment> 
It is noticed here, that infective length, group name, and devolution is not applied in their 
convention. 
Additionally, the modifiers have been replaced with! vendor-specific comment, which is 
part of the modifiers parameter also used in CARO. To give an idea of the structure a real 
example is listed below: 
Backdoor: Win32/Caphaw.D  
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Figure 3. Detailed Explanation of Naming procedure of a malware sample by Microsoft [10] 
 
 
2.8 Types of Malware 
There are several types of malware as reported by [11] and below is an explanation of the 
essential elements and features of malware types that readers should know and under-
stand. 
2.8.1 Backdoor 
A program that installs on its own to a computer system and makes “a door” to let attack-
ers connect to the system. Backdoors create, achieve and execute code on the system with 
little or no authentication. 
2.8.2 Botnet 
A program similar to backdoor, but with the difference that the information systems af-
fected build a network of bots that receive commands from a server known as command-
and-control server. 
2.8.3 Downloader 
Downloaders are programs embedded in websites, information systems, personal com-
puters whose goal is to download other malicious code 
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2.8.4 Information-stealing malware 
These types of malware also known as keyloggers, password grabbers or sniffers are 
made to collect information and send this information to somewhere else. These types of 
programs can be considered and categorized as Riskware as they are safe when used by 
an authorized person in a suitable activity and status. On the other hand, if misused, or 
employed by an attacker, the program may affect the security of a person or a system. For 
example, keyloggers are often used to monitor users. This is the most common attack to 
acquire access to online banking systems. 
2.8.5 Rootkit 
Rootkits are the type of malware that is constructed to hide other code and are commonly 
connected with another malware, such as backdoor. This, allows the attacker to maintain 
remote access and make detection of the code by investigators difficult.. 
2.8.6 Ransomware 
 One of the most common malware designed to run and execute on all operation systems. 
Their goal is to frighten and make an infected user into buying something. Most of the 
time it has a user interface with instructions on how to proceed with the payments. It 
warns users that there is malicious code by using cryptographic algorithms on their per-
sonal information systems and that the only way to get rid of it, is to pay with digital 
currencies. As an exchange, they will deliver the key to decrypt user's system when it 
does nothing more than stealing people's money or destroying information systems. 
2.8.7 Worm & Virus 
Malicious code whose goal is to copy itself and infect more computers. Usually, it does 
not make changes to other programs. Worms, on the other hand, often search for a specific 
requirement to systems and when they find them they change them. The greatest infection 
is Stuxnet targeting SCADA systems. 
2.8.8 Reverse Shell 
A reverse shell provides access to the attacker to the host that previously got infected or 
permits the connection of an infected system to the attacker. Their functions work as a 
backdoor on the infected host. The way a reverse shell works is that it gives to the attacker 
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the ability to execute and type commands as the intruder is local. Windows cmd.exe and 
Netcat are commonly used for making packaged reverse shells. These methods are used 
to hide from user’s infected information system giving the time to execute commands on 
the infected host. 
2.8.9 RAT – Remote Access Trojan  
A Remote Access Trojan (RAT) is a type of malware which gives unauthorized access to 
an attacker and allows the control of the infected host using a backdoor. Remote Access 
Trojans are often distributed through free-of-charge software and are sent as an attach-
ment by e-mail. 
2.8.10 Browser Hijacker 
Browser hijackers are malicious software that is designed and programmed with the aim 
of changing the homepage, usually the search engine provider. They are often installed 
through free software, and they target the more novice user that will not consider them as 
malicious. They are malicious as sometimes are adware or spyware having access to 
user’s online privacy 
2.8.11 Bootkit 
Another type of a rootkit is bootkit. Its name was taken because it is hidden in the boot 
sector making it hard to be detected by antiviruses and intrusion detection systems after 
its infection. 
2.8.12 Scareware 
A type like ransomware is called scareware that most commonly tries to frighten the in-
fected user making him/her purchase something. It comes as a mail attachment with a 
blackmail text or an information mail that has to do some steps to remove another virus. 
Because of these methods, many victims will pay for the software to have the virus re-
moved.  
2.8.13 Spam Sending Malware 
Spam Sending Malware is malicious software that is a part of a botnet controlled by a 
command and control server operating as a distributed spam-sending network. This, hap-
pens to spread usually another malware or give the computational resources by infecting 
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another system for malicious activities. Sometimes ISPs take countermeasures against 
this botnet by disabling the victim’s internet connection or marking as spam email ad-
dresses. 
 
2.8.14 Potentially Unwanted Program (PUP) 
Also, known as Potentially Unwanted Application (PUA), Potentially Unwanted Web 
Application (PUWA, Popups), Potentially Unwanted Software (PUS). It is usually a soft-
ware that acts and has an unusual behavior with undesirable and unwanted utilities and 
functions but does not meet the requirements to be considered as malware. What makes 
PUPs complicated to be analyzed and classified is that for some people, they are consid-
ered useful but malicious for others. Most of the times a PUP can impact productivity, 
privacy, and security but also it can put unwanted stress on the resources of a system. 
  Unintended impact on productivity:  
• Upsetting with regard to user experience. 
• Futility. 
• The program acts and behaves unexpected, unwelcome and unauthorized actions, 
which point to unwanted distractions, lost opportunities or lowered productivity. 
• Many times, operators of the affected systems should perform maintenance and 
cleaning procedures that take time. 
  Unwanted stress on the device's resources:  
• Computing resources like Memory, CPU, and hard drive are used more than the 
usual.  
• Increased Bandwidth. 
 
 
 
 
  Compromises security:  
• Publicity and vulnerable to unexpected, controversial and unsubstantiated con-
tent, location or applications. 
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  Compromises privacy:  
• Personal information including sensitive software is unnecessarily disclosed to 
unknown or unauthorized parties. 
2.8.15 Spyware:  
Collects information about the user's web browsing activities or favorited applications. 
The data collected are usually sent out to another person. 
2.8.16 Trackware: 
It provides the utilities in order a user or an information system to be identified by third 
parties, usually with a unique identifier. The most common trackware is tracking cookies. 
2.8.17 Adware:  
Distributes malicious code and content through a web browser, PC's Desktop or mobile 
applications. An alternative name for this type of malware is malvertising using known 
companies and their advertising banners to distribute malware through them. 
2.9 Malware Detection 
2.9.1 Introduction to Malware Detection and Deep Learning 
Neural networks have attained a reputation throughout the years. Deep learning has per-
formed well, suggesting solutions for advance persistent threats and zero-day protection. 
This dissertation aims to discuss countermeasures that should be performed to predict 
attacks that should do with malware and, to address the importance of machine learning 
from security point of view. 
Current anti-virus software detects a type of malware after its infection or after it has done 
the damage that it is intent to do. So, detecting malicious code using collected datasets 
and using neural networks and fuzzy techniques should be presented based on the behav-
ior of their procedures. Recognizing and identifying a problem automatically is a signifi-
cant problem. Researchers and analysts can examine a small number of files, so the need 
for large-scale techniques and classification is necessary using neural networks which 
give us several training algorithms that can be tested for. 
The Science of Artificial Intelligence plays a major role in automatic and large-scale mal-
ware classification. Machine learning frameworks have been researched, developed and 
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tested to characterize and categorize malware into their malware families, using charac-
teristics extracted and acquired from static and live analysis of the malicious software. 
Feature engineering and extraction methodologies require time, which does not scale well 
to the daily malware samples, binaries that have been analyzed and other malicious soft-
ware being recorded and submitted for further investigation by researchers who collect 
and analyze malware or repositories that host malware. So, it is mandatory to search and 
find new methods for feature engineering and extraction, to perform useful classification 
algorithms.  
Nataraj, Karthikeyan, Jacob, & Manjunath, 2011 in [12] introduced a new approach and 
method, called binary-texture analysis. 
This process should be examined in contrast with similar and existing malware classifi-
cation approaches previously published. Research results suggest that binary texture anal-
ysis provides comparable and similar results regarding accuracy obtained from experi-
ments performed with dynamic analysis procedures. In addition, it provides and produces 
outcomes faster than the results produced by dynamic procedures. Furthermore, the tex-
ture-based methodology and technique shows resilience to packing techniques, and can 
successfully categorize a significant amount of malware with both encrypted and unen-
crypted fragments with the difference of considering encrypted samples as a different 
malware family. 
2.9.2 Basic theory in Sandboxing 
Oktavianto & Muhardianto, 2013 in [13] state that as technology progresses, malware 
became more sophisticated, more complicated and harder to analyze. So, there is a need 
for new ways of prevention, and that would allow us to analyze malware quickly and 
efficiently without compromising or infecting information systems. Sandboxing has vast 
applications among industry that belongs to information technology. It is a method of 
separating a malicious program from the rest of the information system by providing lim-
ited execution capabilities. Sandbox, allows analysts to run and execute malicious appli-
cations, files, software or codes and see the malware activities and intents. It also main-
tains a safe and secure environment without worrying about the changes that will take 
place during the process. There are several malware sandboxes for building automated 
malware analysis lab like Malheur and Cuckoo Sandbox.   
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3 The role of Artificial Intelligence 
in Malware Detection 
3.1 Literature review for Artificial Intelligent        
Malware Detection 
Various machine learning algorithms (Perceptron, MeanShift, DBSCAN, etc) have been 
conducted and developed regarding the detection, identification and classification of un-
identified and unrecognized malware into known malware families. Some of these algo-
rithms and methodologies being utilized, are described in this subsection of this chapter. 
First, Schultz, Eskin, Zadok, & Stolfo, 2001 [14], applied and extracted three signature-
based characteristics for malware classification: Byte sequences Portable Executables 
(PE) and computer variables most likely strings. The directory of DLLs, function calls 
and several system calls employed within each DLL used by the file and executable, are 
reversed engineered and abstracted from DLL records and data that are enclosed to Port-
able Executable files. Computer variables are processed and analyzed from the executable 
files established by the text computer variables that are encrypted in program files.  All 
the sequences of n bytes that are being modified and derived from an executable file are 
named in general as byte sequence.  
Their performance results were improved by  Kolter & Maloof, 2006 in [15], using data 
mining methodologies and n-gram as a feature to detect malware. The algorithms chosen 
were Naïve Bayes, Support Vector Machines, Decision Trees with the last giving the best 
classification results.  
Need for automation on malware classification was stressed by Kong & Yan, 2013 in 
[16]. Authors proposed a framework that depends on function call graph of malware. 
After finding a good way to extract the features based on function call graph for each 
malware sample, they used distance metrics to find the similarities between two malware 
programs. These metrics clustered and categorized the malware samples to same malware 
and class family while using a limited range kept the different groups separated. Having 
tested that approach an aggregation of classifying algorithms was utilized and suggested 
 -25- 
 
that learns from pairwise malware distances to categorize malware into certain malware 
families. 
Tian, Islam, Batten, & Versteeg, 2010 in [17] focused on classifying Trojans that use 
function length frequency. The amount of bytes that determines the function length is in 
the cipher. The performance of the algorithms shows that the function range along with 
its frequency are meaningful in the field of identification of malware families and is as-
sociated with other characteristics for malware classification regarding performance. 
WEKA library provides such algorithm for categorizing malware. 
 A different approach that was suggested from Santos in [18] mentions that a reasonable 
number of supervised executable files for malicious and benign samples were used in a 
semi-supervised methodology for identification and discovery of zero day exploits. This 
methodology utilizes and tries to perform machine learning using a lot of supervised and 
unsupervised cases and experiments. Learning with Local and Global Consistency 
(LLGC) which is a semi-supervised model, is employed, which can be trained from su-
pervised and unsupervised data and provides an answer regarding the basic architecture 
presented by both supervised and unsupervised situations. A n-gram method characterizes 
and defines executables. Moreover, researchers conduct and assess the ideal amount of 
supervised situations and the effect of these situations regarding accuracy. Goal achieved 
of this inquiry and investigation is to decrease the amount of necessary supervised cases 
while achieving significant accuracy. The only downgrade is that supervised training 
methodologies were shown and presented better performance above or near 90%.  
 Another interesting research was done by Siddiqui, Wang, & Lee, 2009 in [19]. Their 
intention was to detect worms while examining the packets from traffic and find samples 
that are not yet analyzed and submitted to vendors, (also known as a term in the wild, 
another exciting field of detection). Before reverse engineering the samples, compilers 
and packers are identified and discovered. Decision Tree and Random Forest are utilized 
for classification and to make sequence reduction.  
Zolkipli & Jantan, 2011 in [20] wanted to see malware classification from the point of 
view of malware behavior analysis as they believed that dynamic analysis could improve 
accuracy and performance. Every fragment is executed on Anubis and CWSandbox 
where actions of malware are identified. Analyzers generate results that use artificial in-
telligent and neural network depended on dynamic analysis. The malware are then 
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grouped into malware families. Main disadvantage of the research is today’s internet traf-
fic makes it impossible to use social analysis to achieve the desired results.  
Another automatic behavior-based malware analysis framework was announced by  
Rieck et al., 2011 in [21] using machine learning. As most of the frameworks do, it col-
lects many malicious samples and monitors their behavior using a sandbox virtual envi-
ronment. After that conclusion and consideration, they inserted the results in a vector to 
implement and develop the algorithms. So, clustering was utilized to identify the families 
and clusters of malware with similar behavior.  
The classification was focused on attaching and connecting zero-day vulnerabilities to 
identified clusters. This, was implemented to show and present that clustering and classi-
fication, focused and based on behavior-based analysis can process the activities of mal-
ware executables every day. 
Anderson et al., 2011 in [22] presented a malware detection algorithm based on the anal-
ysis of graphs constructed after the dynamic collection of instruction traces. Modification 
of malware analysis framework based on Ether was used to gather samples. Methodology 
suggests the control of 2-grams to state the likelihood of a Markov chain graph. System 
of graph kernels is implemented to compute and calculate similarity vector between in-
stances in the learning phase. Two metrics that finds and searches similarities, a Gaussian 
kernel, which computes and calculates the local similarity between graph edges and a 
spectral kernel which computes the global similarity between charts, calculates a kernel 
vector. Critical dissimilar behaviors of malware determine the performance of various 
kernel learning procedures. A disadvantage, is the high computational complexity, so the 
usage in actual situations and real environments is limited. 
Bayer et al. in [23] suggested a method that puts effectively and automatically into classes 
malicious datasets. In order to apply more information sources, an extension for Anubis 
was implemented with taint-propagation efficiencies. An abstraction of evidences was 
created in addition with an observable outline for every trail, which aids as input to the 
Locality Sensitive Hashing (LSH) algorithm. Researchers show the scalability of their 
method by classifying a large dataset of malware data in a few hours. 
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Tian et al., 2010 in [24] utilized an automated tool for extracting API call sequences from 
binaries while these are running in a virtual environment. Tian utilized and applied clas-
sification methods from WEKA software to separate malicious data from good data but 
also, for classifying malware into their families.  
Biley, in [25] constructed a classifier that explains malware’s activities regarding system 
changes. Α firewall is used to restrict and protect from the impact of any sudden and 
unnecessary activity during examination. A behavioral identity of malicious behavior was 
developed which includes network connection and processes created. To perform con-
nection of the malware samples, a distance metric known as normalized compression dis-
tance (NCD) was applied and tested. The method performed an automated categorization 
of a specific set of malware samples. Biley, also measured and compared the fullness, 
integrity and condensation of the clusters and compared them with the clusters of AV 
vendors. As a disadvantage, can be considered that analysts encountered problems with 
consistency as the efficiency and the status are static. 
A malware classification method was suggested by, Park et al., 2010 in [26] which de-
pends on maximal component subgraph detection. First, a sandbox environment is used 
to execute and analyze malware samples, while system calls are taken, and a directed 
chart is created from these system call trays. For the comparison of the two programs the 
maximal common subgraph is calculated and estimated. However, there are some already 
known malware whose their primary ability is to gain root authorization bypassing the 
analysis procedure. 
Another procedure for malware detection proposed by  Firdausi et al., 2010 in [27] ana-
lyzes malware samples using Anubis. Machine learning is used for processing infor-
mation and records into sparse vector models for classification. 
Nari & Ghorbani, 2013 [28] developed a model for automatic malware classification into 
their specific and particular clusters depended on network performance. Their method 
depends on network traces applied as pcap input files to the model, that have been ana-
lyzed, processed and extracted. Afterward, a graph and plot of the network activities of 
malware was presented. Some features of these figures are adopted and used to classify 
malware using classification algorithms. 
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Lee et al., 2007 has developed another machine learning method in [29] regarding clus-
tering malicious software. After the dataset is performed in a virtual environment where 
reports are exported, a behavioral profile is produced describes the sample’s interaction 
with system resources. After the similarity between two profiles is computed, clustering 
algorithms are being applied like k-means and nearest neighbor to cluster them appropri-
ately. In this method, the obstacle of obfuscation and execution-stalling techniques has 
made necessary the research of hybrid methods for better results. 
Santos, Devesa, Brezo, Nieves, & Bringas, 2013  in [30] again developed a hybrid zero-
day detector called OPEM, which uses and exploits characteristics gathered and collected 
from the analysis of malevolent code. Signature-based malware analysis obtains the static 
characteristics, and dynamic malware analysis captures dynamic features. Two disparate 
datasets are compared through different classification algorithms. This method improves 
the accuracy and speed of both methods when running individually. Islam et al., 2013 
does something similar in [31].  
Anderson et al., 2011 in [32] suggested a method, in which various information and fea-
tures are utilized. Kernels based on Markov Chain graphs are being proposed for the bi-
nary file, disassembled file, and two dynamic traces. A graph-let kernel is applied and 
implemented for the control flow graph. A Gaussian kernel is executed for the file infor-
mation data matrix. In order to find weighted connections between the data multiple ker-
nel learning is employed. Moreover, to categorize and separate the dataset into malicious 
and benign files, support vector machine classifier is applied. The results have shown 
great performance. 
As literature shows data science proposes several solutions for categorizing malware. 
Machine Learning is increasingly being applied in a variety of industries. No doubt that 
Information Security should be one of those, as the extent and complexity of networks is 
ever increasing. Internet and “cloud” applications generate vast data sets from perfor-
mance monitoring and event logs which require scalable and flexible techniques to distil 
useful and actionable information. 
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3.2 Feature Engineering explanation 
Due to the existence of large-scale malware search and retrieval and large datasets, there 
is a need for Cross-Validation. So, it is necessary to have a feature (data) matrix X and a 
label vector y. Once these two are calculated and computed by the algorithm, it is easy to 
split the data into training/testing and then pass them to a classification algorithm.  
For data matrix x, GIST was used to calculate, measure and compute texture features, 
which uses a wavelet decomposition of an image taken from Nataraj et al., 2011 [7] and 
[33]. This feature has been proved favorable, performed and used in scene classification 
and object classification. In this problem, instead of scenes, there are malware samples 
converted to images.  
 
Figure 4: GIST Features projected in lower dimensions using 
multidimensional scaling [7] 
 
As sarvam team on their blog [34] explains for the Malimg Dataset, the length of y is 
equal to the total amount of data samples meaning that in our experiment environment 
there are more than 9.000. The values of y depend on the number of families (classes), so 
in this situation, the numerical values to the different categories from 0 to 24. 
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A short explanation of cross-validation is necessary for understanding the methodology. 
Below is the actions and steps taken for every k-fold in the cross-validation technique: 
• K-1 of the folds are used as training data to perform the training phase. 
• Outputs are then approved and accepted as a test set in order to check and 
calculate accuracy for the rest of the dataset. 
In general, these procedures are in a loop and the computed results after k-fold cross-
validation are the average of the values calculated. The method is considered to be com-
putationally demanding, but researchers use it for the advantage of keeping much of 
data the same. [36] 
Figure 5: Diagram showing the process of identification of malware samples [34] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Illu tratio  1:  pictur  taken from sarvam blog [1] 
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3.3 How to convert Malware Samples to                  
Digital Images  
 
The first step is to turn all the samples to digital images. The image similarity fingerprints 
(feature vectors) will be computed on these images. One more option could be the com-
putation of the fingerprints in memory without saving the image on disk saving space 
from the hard drive.  
import numpy, scipy, os, array 
filename = 'sample'; 
f = open(filename,'rb'); 
ln = os. path.getsize(filename); # length of file in bytes 
width = 256; 
rem = ln%width;  
 
a = array.array("B"); # uint8 array 
a.fromfile(f,ln-rem); 
f.close();  
 
g = numpy.reshape(a,(len(a)/width,width)); 
g = numpy.uint8(g); 
scipy.misc.imsave('sample.png',g); # save the image 
A sample is defined as the name of the malware file that needs to be converted into digital 
images. 
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Figure 7: General structure of the information gained by converting malware to image. [7] 
 
Figure 61 : Malware converted to image first picture is a byte file and the second picture is 
an asm file [7] 
 
Illustration 2:  malware samples after conversion first is byte file and the second an asm file 
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Figure 8: How malware samples are presented as images and how they appear differently even 
in their dimension length and width. [7] 
When the conversion from the sample to image is finished, the next step is to compute a 
compact fingerprint for every binary. This fingerprint captures the structural/visual simi-
larity between malware variants and is comparable with dynamic analysis. 
 
 
import Image,leargist 
im = Image.open('sample.png'); 
im1 = im.resize((64,64)); # for faster computation 
des = leargist.color_gist(im1); # 960 values 
feature = des [0:320]; # since the image is grayscale, need only first 320 values 
In addition, packing transforms an executable, binary or asm file to a completely differ-
ent form. As a result, the image extracted after packing, also appears completely differ-
ent. Furthermore, there is a belief and misunderstanding that if two malware executables 
belonging to different malware families or classes are packed and encrypted using the 
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same packer, they will appear the same. Figure 9 explains that this assumption is wrong 
and the Art of Unpacking in Black Hat, [9] presents more details about packing tech-
niques. 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Shows malware images after packing and the differences, based on Nataraj’s re-
search on [7], 
4 Experiment Setup 
4.1 Software and Hardware Specifications 
The environment used to perform tests is an Ubuntu 16.04 LTS (Xenial Xerus) system 
64bit (AMD 64 bit) with 16 GB RAM and 1 TB Hard drive. To perform the experiments, 
Python programming language is used with some packages, libraries, and modules that 
help us to carry out the data analysis. The pyleargist package is imported to compute. For 
Neural Networks and the implementation of the Multilayer Perceptron experiments have 
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been conducted with the usage of TensorFlow and Theano libraries, information about 
the documentation and the functions are written in [35]. 
The dataset used for demonstration is the Malimg Dataset, from the paper [7] Nataraj et 
al., 2011 Malware Images: Visualization and Automatic Classification.  This dataset com-
prises 25 malware families with varying number of variants per family. 
4.2 Explanation of the Dataset 
The dataset could be considered one of the most crucial parts for supervised classification 
as it should be correctly arranged. That is the reason that all the experiments are conducted 
with the Malimg Dataset. The table below, shows how this dataset is distributed and de-
livered. There are 25 malware families (classes), and every family has a varying number 
of samples. Total malware samples are 9342. 
Table 1: Detailed and Categorized content of Malimg Dataset 
 
No Family Family Name No. of Variants 
1 Worm Allaple.L 1591 
2 Worm Allaple.A 2949 
3 Worm Yuner.A 800 
4 PWS Lolyda.AA 1 213 
5 PWS Lolyda.AA 2 184 
6 PWS Lolyda.AA 3 123 
7 Trojan C2Lop.P 146 
8 Trojan C2Lop.gen!G 200 
9 Dialer Instantaccess 431 
10 Trojan Downloader Swizzor.gen!l 132 
11 Trojan Downloader Swizzor.gen!E 128 
12 Worm VB.AT 408 
13 Rogue Fakerean 381 
14 Trojan Alueron.gen!J 198 
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15 Trojan Malex.gen!J 136 
16 PWS Lolyda.AT 159 
17 Dialer Adialer.C 125 
18 Trojan Downloader WinTrim.BX 97 
19 Dialer Dialplatform.B 177 
20 Trojan Downloader Dontovo.A 162 
21 Trojan Downloader Obfuscator.AD 142 
22 Backdoor Agent.FYI 116 
23 Worm: AutoIT Autorun.K 106 
24 Backdoor Rbot!gen 158 
25 Trojan Skintrim.N 80 
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Figure 10: A representative snapshot of Malware families converted to Images [7]. 
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4.3 Theory of Classification Algorithms implemented 
According to scikit’s library and OpenCV’s documentation [36] an explanation of the 
algorithms used in this dissertation for experiment is provided below. 
4.3.1 Support Vector Machines (SVMs) 
Based on the bibliography and the theory explained in the documentation of scikit library 
and OpenCV’s literature [36] below is some of the basics mathematics behind SVMs. 
Support Vector Machine (SVM) applies and employs a set of supervised learning meth-
odologies used for classification, regression, and outlier’s detection. So, given a super-
vised learning dataset, the algorithm outputs an optimal hyperplane which classifies new 
examples.  
 
Figure 11: SVM Hyper lanes trying to find a possible solution to a problem [36] 
 
 
Sometimes more than one line could be the solution to the problem, so there is a need to 
find a way to give a description patterned to choose which solution is better than the other. 
SVM algorithm’s primary goal is to find the optimal separating hyperplane of the training 
data. 
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Support Vector Machines have their pros and cons. 
The advantages of support vector machines are: 
• They are productive and give satisfactory results when the number of samples is 
lower than the number of dimensions. 
• They use support vectors, a part of the set of training points in the decision func-
tion, so it can easily be said that some kind of a memory can be achieved, making 
dissertation’s goal more feasible. 
• They are considered versatile due to different kernel functions that can be speci-
fied for the decision function. Specific kernels are provided, but it is also possible 
to define custom kernels. 
The disadvantages of support vector machines include: 
• It does not usually provide good results if the number of samples is much lower 
than the number of features. 
• With SVMs, there are no probability estimations as these evaluations are com-
puted using an expensive five-fold cross-validation. 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Optimal hyper-
plane separation  [36] 
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4.3.2 Perceptron 
Perceptron algorithm is used for supervised learning of functions that can decide, predict 
and calculate whether a vector of values and data that is used as an input belongs to one 
class or another. It is a classification algorithm that is considered as a linear classifier 
meaning that it tries to predict focusing on a linear predictor function combining a set of 
weights with the feature vector. As the data in training, the dataset is processed one at a 
time allowing researcher and analysts to use perceptron for online learning. 
Figure 13 shows how a perceptron with a single layer is learning and categorizes the 
samples.  
 
Figure 13: Steps of a perceptron finding an optimal solution. [36] 
 
A perceptron is a linear classifier meaning that if there is a training set that is not linear it 
will never find an optimal solution to the problem where all the input matrices will be 
separated with a correct hyperlane. As a result, the training phase will stop computing 
and performing. So, there is a need to know the linear separability of the learning set. 
However, if the learning set or the problem that is encountered is linearly separable, then 
the perceptron is assured and confident to find a solution, and there is a limit known as 
an upper threshold and there is a certain number of times that the algorithm will refine 
and modify its weights during the training. 
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As explained above a perceptron algorithm is possible and supposed to find an acceptable 
solution in the case of a linearly separable training and learning set, but it may still choose 
though any solution or the algorithm may realize many solutions of differing quality. To 
find a solution to this problem linear support vector machine was developed and applied. 
4.3.3 Multilayer Perceptron 
Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) has a structure of mainly three tiers, the input tier, the hid-
den tiers and the outcome tier. Every tier of MLP consists of nodes connected with the 
nodes from the prior and the later tier.  
 
All  layers of neurons in MLP have various and different input connections in the process 
of taking the results and output of data from the previous layer nodes, as a result, it pro-
duces several output links for the next layer of nodes. The numbers computed and calcu-
lated from the last segment or number of nodes are summarized with specific weights, 
individual for each node, after it considers the bias term to compute new results. The 
amount is computed with the help of the activation function that may also be dissimilar 
for dissimilar nodes. 
 
Figure 14: A model and structure of a multilayer per-
ceptron, [36] 
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Figure 15: A more logical diagram of how multilayer perceptron works after it takes some data 
matrix x inputs. [36] 
From the documentation of the OpenCV library below is an explanation of the MLP al-
gorithm [36] 
 
 
Figure 16: Bipolar sigmoid function [36] 
 
All the neurons in Multilayer Perceptron have the same initiation functions, with the same 
variables that users define and the learning phase does not change them. 
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Procedures and steps taken for the training of the model is mentioned below: 
• Set data matrix with features as initiator and activator.  
• The scale of the entry tier is equal to the matrix size. 
• Insert and Put initial values to the first hidden tier. 
• Calculate outcomes of the hidden tier with the use of the weights and the initiation 
services. 
• Allow and set additional results later until you compute the final tier. [36] 
In order to compute the model and system, there is a need to have all the weights. The 
model takes an instruction set, several initial matrices with the appropriate matrices, and 
modifies the weights to allow and authorize the model to contribute to the inclined reac-
tion to the provided information matrices. [36] 
Having a broad network of hidden layers gives the ability for inherent system flexibility. 
The computation of the error on the training subset can become extremely low after sum-
marization. However, the trained system gets the data and shows the noise in the training 
set. This has as a result, the percentage of the error on the test subset increases after the 
size of the system comes to its limit. Furthermore, MLP trains large systems, so it is 
tolerable to preliminary process of data, but it trains small systems for only essential fea-
tures. 
A disadvantage of MLP can be considered the inefficiency to handle unlimited data.  
MultiLayer Perceptron performs and develops two training Multilayer models and frame-
works, a random sequential back-propagation algorithm and a batch RPROP framework. 
4.3.4 Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) 
Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) is a linear classifier algorithm that it is considered 
efficient and simple for discriminative learning. Stochastic Gradient Descent is imple-
mented for experiments because it performs large-scale classification with good results. 
Most of the times it is used for text classification and natural language processing. Gra-
dient descent performs optimization focusing on neural networks. These algorithms, how-
ever, are often used as black-box optimizers, as there are some advantages and limitations 
that are hard to get unnoticed. 
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The advantages of Stochastic Gradient Descent are: 
• Relevance and Productivity. 
• It can be implemented and modified accordingly to each problem code wise. 
The disadvantages of Stochastic Gradient Descent include: 
• It has several hyperparameters such as the regularization parameters. 
• It is impressionable to feature scaling selection. 
4.3.5 Nearest Centroid 
The Nearest Centroid is a classification model that shows every malware family of data 
by the centroid of its samples. It has many similarities with KMeans clustering algorithm. 
One is the feature of having no variables to choose. When families or classes have many 
differences, it experiences problems on non-convex classes. Nearest Centroid actions are 
related to the phase where labels are updated by Kmeans algorithm.  
The algorithm behind Nearest neighbor can be explained below: 
First of all, it is the training phase where given labeled training samples  
 
with class labels y belongs to Y, compute the per-class centroids  
 
Finally, the prediction function that computes the class assigned to an observation x is  
 
4.3.6 Multinomial Bayes 
The Naïve Bayes Classifier (NB) is a simple effective classification algorithm which has 
been employed and applied in the field of data analysis. The NB method depends on the 
Bayes’s rule and is usually chosen and suggested when the dimensions of the data of the 
initial values is high. Naïve Bayes classifiers take for granted that the effect of a variable 
value on a given family or class is autonomous of the values of another variable. The 
Naive-Bayes activator measures and calculates dependent likelihoods of the malware 
families offered in the experiment and chooses the malware family with the highest value. 
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Relying on the accurate character of the likelihood algorithm, Naïve Bayes classifiers can 
be trained very efficiently in a supervised learning setting.  
Moreover, Naive Bayes can be considered as a method for structuring classification mod-
els which attach class labels to case instances served as matrices of feature values, where 
the class labels are chosen from a supervised dataset. It cannot be considered as a sin-
gle algorithm for training like classifiers, but a group of algorithms depending on a com-
mon assumption: all naive Bayes classifiers assume that the value of a particular charac-
teristic is autonomous of the value of any other feature, given the class variable. There 
are some probability models where Naive Bayes classifiers can be trained very efficiently 
in a supervised learning experiment and environment. In many realistic experiments and 
operations, parameter prediction for naive Bayes models applies the method of maximum 
likelihood. 
Even though their design can be considered naïve and messy with the conclusion of pro-
ducing simple assumptions, Naive Bayes classifiers perform well in many complex situ-
ations and real life environment. 
A strength of Naive Bayes is that it needs a small amount of training data to estimate and 
predict the parameters essential for classification. So, Naïve Bayes classifiers are incred-
ibly fast compared to more sophisticated methods and approaches. 
4.3.7 Decision Trees 
A decision tree is a binary tree, and a non-parametric supervised learning method that can 
be utilized for classification where each child of this tree is considered as a class label but 
also many leaves may have the same label. Moreover, can be used for regression, meaning 
that a constant that is assigned for each tree leaf, to the approximation function being 
piecewise constant. So, decision’s tree goal is to make a prediction model that calculates 
and computes the target variable from decision rules that come from the data features 
being extracted. 
Some advantages of decision trees are: 
• Easy to understand and to be defined.  
• Trees can be visualized.  
• Demands little time for the data to be arranged.  
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• There is no need for data normalization 
• The complexity of using the data that they considered to be predicted is logarith-
mic in the number of data values utilized to train the tree.  
• Ability to manage both numerical and unconditional data. Other techniques are 
usually based and focused in analyzing datasets that have only one type of varia-
ble.  
• Ability to manage multi-variant problems.  
• Uses a white box method. If a given situation is apparent in a method, the expla-
nation for the condition is easily explained by Boolean logic.  
• On the other hand, in a black box model such as artificial neural network, conclu-
sions may be harder to defined as the possible method can be the validation of a 
model using statistical tests about reliability. 
The disadvantages of decision trees consist of: 
• Decision-tree learners that can produce and make over-complex trees that do not 
generalize the data well-meaning that often researchers encounter overfitting.  
• Decision trees can be insecure, risky and irrational because small changes or var-
iations in the data might end up with an entirely different tree being produced and 
calculated. This problem can be counter measured by using decision trees within 
an ensemble. 
• Training and learning an optimal decision tree is considered as an NP-complete 
problem under several visible features of optimality and even for simple concepts. 
Therefore, practical decision-tree learning algorithms are in a firm position on 
heuristic algorithms such as the greedy algorithm where locally optimal decisions 
are created at each tree-node. Such algorithms cannot assure or promise to pro-
duce the most acceptable optimal decision tree. This, again can be encountered 
and mitigated by learning multiple trees in an altogether trainer, where the features 
and samples are at random sampled with replacement. 
• Some problems are not easy to find a solution or to train and learn because deci-
sion trees do not categorize them quickly, such as XOR, parity or multiplexer 
experiments. 
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• Decision tree trainers generate biased trees if some classes overshadow and rule. 
So, a suggestion is to define and refine the dataset before so as to fit with the 
decision tree. 
4.3.8 Bernoulli Restricted Boltzmann Machine (RBM) 
A restricted Boltzmann machine (RBM) is a generative stochastic artificial neural net-
work that can learn a probability distribution over its set of inputs. 
Researchers and scientists apply Restricted Boltzmann machines in deep learning net-
works. 
Original RBM has binary-valued hidden and visible entities and involves a matrix of 
weights related to the relation between visible group and hidden group, but also bias 
weights for the hidden groups and the visible groups. Having these statements, the source 
of a configuration is defined as a combination of Boolean vectors. 
To conclude, by definition, Boltzmann machines, probability distributions over hidden 
and visible models are determined regarding the energy function. 
 
Restricted Boltzmann machines aim to finding the maximum of the results of likelihoods 
attached and authorized to a training subset. 
Some procedures for a single data sample can be mentioned and seen below: 
• Take a learning model, calculate the likelihood of the hidden groups and try an 
unidentified activation matrix from this likelihood classification. 
• Calculate the external output and outcome of the two vectors and name it as the 
positive gradient. 
• Gibbs sampling procedure-From first vector, try a reformation a new vector of 
the non-hidden groups, then retry the hidden activations from this. 
• Calculate the external output and outcome of the new vectors and name it as 
negative gradient. 
• Allow the new weight matrix be the positive gradient minus the negative gradi-
ent, calculate the time of learning phase. Renew likewise the biases [36]. 
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4.3.9 Random Trees-Forest 
Random Forest took its name from the collection of the tree predictors that are designed 
to handle both classification and regression problems.   
The Algorithm of Random Forest has the following steps:  
1st Step: Feature-data vector is integrated into the random forest classifier the random 
trees classifier. 
2nd Step: It is classified with every tree in the forest. 
3rd Step:  The label of the family or class that has the most similarities commonly referred 
as votes, answers or replies, is outputted thus to the problem.  
When a regression problem exists, the algorithm produces the average of the replies-votes 
for all the trees in the forest. The trees are trained with similar principles but on dissimilar 
training datasets.  
4.4 Theory of Clustering Algorithms implemented 
4.4.1 MeanShift Clustering 
MeanShift clustering is also a centroid algorithm, which utilizes and functions by bring-
ing up to date prospects by computing the mean of values for centroids within a supplied 
area.  Proposals are refined and pre-processed in a phase to erase and get rid of almost 
duplicates of data to form the final set of centroids. Moreover, there is an automatic way 
that identifies clusters, ignoring parameter bandwidth, which enforces the area to be 
searched for. High scalability is not the algorithm’s strong feature, as various nearest 
neighbor examinations are needed. MeanShift is certain to find a solution or to conclude 
in one. On the other hand, MeanShift will stop calculations when there is small alteration 
in centroids [36] 
MeanShift can be specified as  
1. Define a window around each data point.  
2. Measure and calculate the mean of data within the window.  
3. Move the center of window to the mean and repeat till convergence. 
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4. After every repetition the windows alter to a compressed region of the set of data 
 
The fact that MeanShift does not make assumptions about the number of clusters or the 
shape of the group makes it ideal for performing dissertation’s hypothesis of the recrea-
tion of the clusters of Malimg dataset but also it handles groups of non-fixed shape and 
number. [36] 
4.4.2 DBSCAN Algorithm 
The DBSCAN algorithm treats clusters as areas of high density divided by areas of low 
density. Thus, groups produced by DBSCAN can be any shape, and not like KMeans 
which takes for granted that clusters are convex shaped. When high density is mentioned, 
researchers talks about the core samples that are also considered as features and charac-
teristics of the algorithm. So, a group of data is a set of gist specimens, close to each other 
after being calculated by a distance metric and a set of non-gist specimens that are close 
to a core sample. There are two parameters and characteristics on how this algorithm 
works, called minsamples and eps, which describes officially what densely is. Higher 
minsamples or lower eps indicate higher density necessary to form a cluster. 
A core sample or data is in an area of the vector space when in a sample of the dataset 
such that there exist minsamples within neighbors of the core sample. A group is a fixed 
area of core samples, that can be created by picking a core fragment and find all its neigh-
bors that again are core specimens. Such a group has a set of non-core data as well, which 
are data that are neighbors of a core fragment in the group but are considered as outliers. 
Any gist feature is part of a group. Further, any cluster has at least minsamples points in 
it, following the definition of a gist fragment. DBSCAN treats as an anomaly any frag-
ment that is not a gist feature, and does have a range and radius more than eps to any gist 
feature. 
The first input provided to the DBSCAN algorithm is the values of data points that needs 
to be clustered. The second input is the definition of a distance function between the 
points. It worths to mention that, intensity distance function is used if pixels of the same 
intensity need to be clustered. The third input sets up the sensitivity of the DBSCAN, 
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which takes the decision if two data points are similar or different. Finally, another sen-
sitivity factor could depend on the density of nearby data points and then decide whether 
a new group should start at a given data point. 
The DBSCAN algorithm can recognize regions and groups to a great spatial data sets by 
examining the local density of database features, using only one input parameter. The 
DBSCAN decides what information should be categorized as anomaly. Perfomance of 
the algorithm is fast and scales very well with the size of a linear collection of data. The 
algorithm can classify nodes into independent groups that characterize the dissimilar mal-
ware families by utilizing the density distribution of nodes. figure 18 shows that 
DBSCAN can discover groups of non-fixed shape. Nevertheless, groups that are near 
each other usually belong to the same malware family or they can be considered as vari-
ants. 
 
Figure 18: Arbitrary shape groups after DBScan algorithm is performed. [38] 
 
4.4.3 KMeans 
K-Means clustering is an algorithm that utilizes the method of vector quantization taken 
from the field of signal processing and most of the time examiners use it for solving clus-
tering problems in data science. K-Means clustering tries to transform the whole dataset 
to Voronoi cells by having observations and make k groups in which every observation 
is a part of a computed nearest mean cluster. 
The problem in computer science is considered NP-hard meaning that is computationally 
difficult to solve. Nevertheless, k-means clustering attends to identify categories of fam-
ilies and classes of comparable spatial extent. 
 -51- 
 
K-means is different from k-nearest neighbor classifier, as they often confused each other 
due to the k in the name. On the other hand, both these algorithms can be combined to 
find and produce better results. A serious problem is that k-means is not very extensible, 
and it is used for vector quantization. The parameter k is admittedly difficult to choose 
when not given by external constraints. Another disadvantage of the algorithm is that it 
cannot be used with arbitrary distance functions or on non-numerical data.  
4.4.4 Minibatch KMeans 
The MiniBatch KMeans is a different approach which utilizes mini-batches to decrease 
the calculation time, while attempting to create more excellent the impartial activity. 
Mini-batches are subgroups of the initial information, randomly modelled in each learn-
ing calculation. These mini-batches exceptionally decrease the number of calculation nec-
essary to gather to a local result and explanation. Compared with other methods that de-
crease the union time of k-means, mini-batch k-means generates solutions that little better 
than the regular and typical method. 
The mini-batch method performs between two major actions, similar to original k-means.  
At first, b fragments are chosen at random from the dataset, to model and pattern a mini-
batch. Results are later attached to the nearest centroid. Secondly, the centroids are re-
newed. For every fragment in the mini-batch, the attached centroid is maintained by com-
municating the average of the fragment and all previous fragments attached to that cen-
troid. As a consequence, the rate of alteration for a centroid over time is reduced. These 
steps are performed in conjunction or until a predefined number of repetitions is achieved.  
4.5 Goals of the experiment and comparison criteria 
As a future work, the aim is to build a classifier tool that can classify malware samples 
automatically and has something like a memory and can organize labels-classes that the 
classifier has not yet processed or learned. 
First, it is necessary to know the right classes (called labels) in the training set. There is a 
need for algorithms that can learn and remember previous testing and experiments. Test-
ing and comparing algorithms are done using a test set, for which the labels are known. 
Many algorithms also use a validation set (mainly part of the labeled training set) to man-
age its learning process. 
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In the results, there are some miss-classifications and low prediction rate. So, a goal is to 
improve these algorithms to find better solutions. 
Another approach that could be considered as the problem was that the classification pro-
cedure takes for granted that all fragments in the dataset are malevolent. This, means that 
if unknown software were injected, it would be classified as malware no matter what. 
Furthermore, another aim is to build models focused on larger datasets, and these models 
will ensure a more robust classification. 
Additionally, the data should be as uniformly distributed as possible, leading to a fairer 
classification. 
Finally, this dissertation will emphasize the necessity to improve the classification rate 
by choosing and take advantage of other features and using a feature selection algorithm. 
To summarize the main differences, the following list has been made. The goal in general 
is to extend and improve the system by: 
1. Performing malware detection. 
2. Performing classification of malware families. 
3. Finding new and improving old features. 
4. Applying a feature selection algorithm, that will select the most discriminative features. 
5. Building an extensive database of malware by collecting more samples. 
6. Retrieving a uniform sample set among the malware classes. 
Finally, comparison criteria to our dissertation except for the part of comparing our ex-
periments and algorithms to each other is the nearest neighbor results as currently is pre-
sented on Sarvam blog. Moreover, the primary hypothesis, is if a recreation of the 25 
malware families and clusters after shuffle them using the clustering algorithms pre-
sented, is possible. Finally, a comparison between Kmeans and MiniBatch Kmeans is 
performed and shown. 
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4.6 Expected Outcomes 
Expected outcomes are the malware images being classified as the first dataset and ar-
ranged within the same subfolders with the same labels or at least be as near as possible 
to the first that is the main reason this dataset were being chosen in this dissertation to 
know the best-classified outcome. Figure 23 shows the expected outcome. 
The goal of clustering algorithms is to test and examine if the same 25 clusters as the 
original dataset can be recreated and achieved. So, the experiments try to reform the same 
groups and cluster from malware samples after the data is shuffled by the algorithm im-
plemented. 
 
Figure 23: Folders with the names of the malware families of Malimg dataset [34] 
 
Also, classification-wise, experiments’ results tested and compared with Nataraj’s results 
on Nearest Neighbor. So, an expected outcome could be a better accuracy machine learn-
ing algorithm. The accuracy of the Nearest Neighbor is 93.36% and from the experiments 
and results does not seem that an algorithm finds better results on accuracy than nearest 
neighbor. Performance is not something that the dissertation aims even if experiments 
need to run as fast as possible and be optimized as much as possible by developers. The 
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detection rate of accuracy and reducing misclassification and detection errors are more 
important. Performance wise the average extraction time is 5s and the time taken by the 
algorithm to classify a sample is 56s. On the other hand, the time that it takes to calculate 
GIST feature is 54ms and the overall classification time was 1.4s, but these numbers de-
pend on Nataraj’s proposal, and they are slightly better and revamped from the code that 
exported the below diagram. So, an expected outcome would be to find better and faster 
algorithms from this proposal.  
 
 
Figure 24: Diagram of the results of nearest neighbor presented in SARVAM’s blog. [34] 
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5 Results of Algorithms 
5.1 Classification Algorithms Results 
The results are presented in a range from 0.00 to 0.1 meaning that having a 0.1 and in the 
correct label there is a 100% correct classification. On the other hand, the algorithms find 
similarities to other malware families even if a detection number is not classified correctly 
by the experiments, meaning that again is at least detected. Furthermore, on some dia-
grams, if it shows results that are not near the line of the confusion matrix, they are con-
sidered as errors, but if they are near the line of the confusion matrix, it may be regarded 
as variants even if they are classified to a different malware family. Figure 25 shows a 
better view of the text below:  
 
Figure 25: Nearest neighbor figure from Sarvam experiments based on Nataraj’s [7] indicating 
the variant interpretation. 
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In implemented algorithms, most of the samples have been classified correctly but other 
samples did not. For that reason, the algorithm might have found similarities in the fin-
gerprint feature on other malware families. Support Vector Machines (SVM) seems to 
have been over trained as the results were not the expected so potential changes on the 
initiated values should be considered. Also, how it can perform better to a different da-
taset, and there is a need to test more on these algorithms is the memory that they provide, 
and it is essential for the general classifier that has to be achieved. Same goes for Ber-
noulliRBM and Multinomial Naive Bayes, on BernoulliRBM algorithm though there was 
a hypothesis to see how an unsupervised algorithm performs to a supervised and classified 
dataset. 
For clustering algorithms, a hypothesis was made while researching if the original dataset 
can be achieved and recreated, meaning that the perfect result would be 25 clusters. Best 
estimation of clusters was from DBScan Algorithm, and then MeanShift did an evaluation 
of 15 groups. Then, again a hypothesis if a particular initiation is given by a researcher 
and a certain number of groups how the results will be using Kmeans and Mini-
BatchKMeans. A comparison was made of the two to identify the differences. The differ-
ences discovered can be interpreted as non-crucial having the conclusion that they per-
form the same way in the current dataset. These algorithms should be carried out on other 
datasets as well to see if they perform the same way. Also, that is the reason why malware 
classification is an ongoing examination and research as there is no explicitly an opinion 
that guaranteed that these algorithms tested will perform the same to different malware 
families. Each dataset is a different problem.   
In information security, advanced persistent threats, malware and malicious are an ongo-
ing battle so effort on that field and a conversation on how the community can improve 
algorithms should start. Moreover, according to a recent survey from Symantec advanced 
persistent threats and more precisely ransomware is one of the most severe and dangerous 
attacks on businesses and organizations in cyberspace and the loss of money in bitcoins 
being million dollars. Only in 2015 the new malware families for ransomware that have 
been discovered are more than 100 plus the previous ones, and the average ransom that 
they ask is at 679 dollars in bitcoins plus decryptors for Green Petya and Cryptowall are 
still unknown. [2] Even if better results can be seen to one algorithm than another, no one 
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cannot easily say that this algorithm should be used for every classification, every algo-
rithm has each pros and cons on time and accuracy. 
 
 
Below is a table that summarizes the results of all the algorithms. 
 
Table 1: Summarized Results of the experiments of the classification algorithms 
Classification 
Algorithms 
Average 
Training Time 
(secs) 
Testing Time 
(secs) 
Average Accuracy 
Decision Tree 6.53 0.00096 0.088-> 88% 
Support Vector 
Machines 
45.93 3.78 Over Trained, Re-evaluation or 
Results that has no meaning due to 
misclassification 
Nearest Centroid 0.218 0.0211 0.0856-> 85.6% 
Stochastic 
Gradient 
1.291 0.0585 0.087->87% plus 2 
missclassfications 
Perceptron 0.817 0.0148 0.0905-> 90.5% plus 4 
missclassifications 
Multilayer 
Perceptron 
16.05 0.091 0.878-> 87.8% plus one 
missclassification 
Random Forest 1.72 0.0063 0.0916->91.6% 
Multinomial 
Naive Bayes 
0.0197 0.001445 Over Trained, Re-evaluation or 
Results that has no meaning due to 
misclassification 
BernoulliRBM 208.276 
 
0.0206 Over Trained, Re-evaluation or 
Results that has no meaning due to 
misclassification 
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Table 2: Summarized Results of the experiments of the clustering algorithms 
Clustering Algorithms Cluster Estimation Predefined Clusters Difference 
MeanShift 15 - - 
DBScan 20 - - 
Kmeans - 2 - 
MiniBatchKMeans - 3 - 
K-Means-MiniBatch 
Comparison 
-  3 
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5.1.1 Classification Results for Decision Tree Algorithm 
 
Figure 26: Decision Tree Algorithm Results 
Decision tree results show that there is no misclassification but only minor accuracy er-
rors (blue squares that are far from the confusion’s matrix line) meaning that some of the 
samples for this algorithm have some similarities with other specimens. In malware anal-
ysis, the C2LOP.P malware family maybe has similarities with C2LOP.gen!g.According 
to the names, this assumption is right as they belong to same malware family and they are 
considered variants but some of their samples can be on the Swizzor.gen!l. Labeling wise 
those few samples are a detection error or more in-depth features need to be examined by 
research to identify if similarities exist. These goes for the other malware families that 
behave the same. 
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After ten folds, the times for the above results are: 
Training Times:  
1st: 5.62584996223, 2nd: 6.11614894867,  
3rd: 7.76607918739, 4th: 6.38322091103,  
5th: 6.60698008537, 6th : 6.37441205978,  
7th : 6.65543818474, 8th     : 6.86663007736,  
9th: 6.49542498589, 10th : 6.36758112907 
 
Testing Time: 0.00096 
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5.1.2 Classification Results for Support Vector Machine (SVM) Algorithm 
 
The results of Support Vector Machine are scrambled after exporting, so there is no mean-
ing and correct explanation on this experiment. They are too misclassified so it cannot 
locate any similarities but also the settings being put for initialization maybe are over 
trained the algorithm on the test phase. From malware detection and analysis perspective, 
the problem was not approached correctly; it may be considered as that this is not simi-
larities but overfitting. Further, testing for potential errors and research for this algorithm 
is necessary.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 27: Support Vector Machine Algorithm Classification Results 
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After ten folds, the times for the above results are: 
Training Times:  
1st = 45.6123859882, 2nd = 45.6906061172, 
3rd = 44.0576298237, 4th = 44.8201007843, 
 5th = 43.707859993, 6th = 45.5356550217,  
7th = 47.0243530273, 8th = 51.7937111855, 
9th = 45.6938140392, 10th = 45.3624200821 
 
Testing Time: 3.78129291534 
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5.1.3 Classification Results for Nearest Centroid Algorithm 
 
Figure 28: Nearest Centroid Algorithm Classification Results 
The results of Nearest Centroid show again that there is no misclassification, but all sam-
ples are kind of classified to the correct labels except some minor errors. An emphasis to 
C2LOP.P should be mentioned as it seems that a small percent is detected and classified 
correctly but most of the samples are classified into other malware families, so this is not 
the best algorithm to use to counter similar samples for this kind of malware family.  
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After ten folds, the times for the above results are:  
 
Training Times: 
1st = 0.0834679603577 ,2nd = 0.0121638774872,                                
3rd = 0.0135629177094,4th = 0.0206859111786, 
5th = 0.0128729343414, 6th = 0.0129809379578, 
7th = 0.0220339298248, 8th = 0.0146219730377, 
9th = 0.0130879878998 ,10th = 0.0122499465942  
 
Testing Time = 0.0210800170898 
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5.1.4 Classification Results for Stochastic Gradient Algorithm 
 
Figure 29: Stochastic Gradient Descent Algorithm Classification Results 
 
In stochastic gradient, there is a misclassification meaning that, for malware detection it 
is considered as an error. Swizzor.gen!.I were much detected as the other malware family 
with same similarities Swizzor.gen!.E. Finally, Autorun.K was misclassified to the 
Yuner.A and most of its samples so it finds similarities between those two. Something 
that it is encountered in other experiments as well. 
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After ten folds, the times for the above results are: 
 
Training Times:  
1st = 1.25240087509 ,2nd = 1.28829216957 
3rd = 1.20172715187, 4th = 1.3295238018, 
5th = 1.26634097099 ,6th = 1.27604484558, 
7th = 1.3377199173 ,8th = 1.25761389732, 
9th = 1.28988003731, 10th = 1.41034507751 
 
Testing Time = 0.0584828853607 
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5.1.5 Classification Results for Perceptron Algorithm 
 
Figure 30: Perceptron Classification Algorithm Results 
On Perceptron, for Autorun.K malware family most of their samples were classified into 
another malware family same goes to C2LOP.gen!g and C2LOP.P, and many similarities 
were found with Swizzor malware family, something that is also encountered to the re-
sults of other experiments with other machine learning algorithms as well. 
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After ten folds, the times for the above results are: 
 
Training Times:  
1st = 0.637459993362, 2nd = 0.9637799263,3rd = 1.10905098915,  
4th = 1.08432793617,5th = 1.05076909065, 6th = 0.668966054916, 
7th = 0.664897203445, 8th = 0.669385910034,9th = 0.664327144623,  
10th = 0.655335903168 
 
Testing Time = 0.0148389339447 
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5.1.6 Classification Results for Multilayer Perceptron Algorithm 
 
Figure 31: Multilayer Perceptron Algorithm Results 
For Multilayer perceptron, Autorun.K is detected and classified to the Yuner.A malware 
family so training a bit more the algorithm could improve the results of this type of mal-
ware. Moreover, it is evident from the matrix produced that the Swizzor variants are being 
classified accordingly. As a conclusion, Neural Networks and more precisely MLP per-
formed excellent with regard to accuracy and performance, and they should certainly need 
to test Deep Learning as an asset to counter these types of attacks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 -70- 
 
After executing the MLP below is the Training and Testing Times: 
 
Training Times:  
[(945, 25)] 1st= 30.1455199718, [(942, 25)] 2nd = 15.0493881702,  
[(938, 25)] 3rd= 14.5006198883, [(936, 25)] 4th= 14.3223490715,  
[(935, 25)] 5th= 13.9758219719, [(935, 25)] 6th = 14.6204409599,  
[(931, 25)] 7th= 14.6933410168, [(929, 25)] 8th = 14.4957091808,  
[(925, 25)] 9th= 14.37383008, [(923, 25)] 10th= 14.3233969212 
 
Testing Times:  
[(945, 25)] 1st = 0.123305082321, [(942, 25)] 2nd = 0.0920000076294, 
[(938, 25)] 3rd = 0.0852298736572, [(936, 25)]4th = 0.0909011363983,  
[(935, 25)] 5th = 0.0852150917053, [(935, 25)] 6th = 0.0866298675537,  
[(931, 25)] 7th = 0.0869810581207, [(929, 25)] 8th = 0.0924861431122,  
[(925, 25)] 9th = 0.0841000080109, [(923, 25)] 10th = 0.0834050178528 
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5.1.7 Classification Results for Random Forest 
 
Figure 32: Random Forest Classification Results 
Random Forest had the best accuracy results from all other machine learning algorithms 
but certainly there is always room and discussion for improvement and further research 
with other datasets. Everything except few blue squares is classified in the correct labels 
and again Swizzor variants were being detected, no misclassifications were encountered 
to this experiment. 
After ten folds, the times for the above results are  
Training Times:  
1st = 1.41754007339, 2nd = 1.60521197319,3rd = 1.56024694443, 4th = 1.66305494308, 
5th = 2.85804891586, 6th = 2.15528392792,7th = 1.42880892754 ,8th = 1.46547293663 
9th = 1.54579615593 ,10th = 1.53822803497 
Testing Time = 0.00629901885986 
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5.1.8 Classification Results for Multinomial Naive Bayes 
 
Figure 33: Multinomial Naive Bayes Algorithm Classification Results 
 
Multinomial Naïve Bayes seems to have issues and does not provide us with precise re-
sults to identify and make conclusions. From malware detection and classification point 
of view, a revamp on the initial values should be considered; There is no evidence that 
malware families were detected and did not find similarities between the samples. 
Training Times: 
 1st = 0.0333349704742, 2nd = 0.0199840068817,3rd = 0.0204889774323, 
 4th = 0.020693063736, 5th = 0.0209469795227,6th = 0.020231962204, 
 7th = 0.0201442241669, 8th = 0.0204341411591,9th = 0.0210590362549 
Testing Time = 0.00144481658936 
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5.1.9 Classification Results for Bernoulli 
 
Figure 34: Restricted Boltzmann Machine Algorithm Results 
Restricted Boltzmann Machines are unsupervised nonlinear feature learners and here are 
implemented for a supervised experiment and dataset. The hypothesis is to see how they 
will perform after the data is shuffled as they usually give good results to a linear problem. 
This method is popular to deep neural networks, and it is known as unsupervised pre-
training. So here results show that RBMBernoulli does work well and there is a need to 
figure out new ways on how to use them or to conclude that they are no good classifiers 
and algorithm for malware detection. 
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Below is some number from the experiment performed by the algorithm. 
 
Iteration 1: pseudo-likelihood = -25.58, time = 8.68s 
Iteration 2: pseudo-likelihood = -25.26, time = 8.50s 
Iteration 3: pseudo-likelihood = -25.29, time = 8.62s 
Iteration 4: pseudo-likelihood = -24.75, time = 7.30s 
Iteration 5: pseudo-likelihood = -25.51, time = 7.49s 
Iteration 6: pseudo-likelihood = -25.99, time = 9.06s 
Iteration 7: pseudo-likelihood = -25.47, time = 9.04s 
Iteration 8: pseudo-likelihood = -25.87, time = 7.14s 
Iteration 9: pseudo-likelihood = -25.59, time = 6.92s 
Iteration 10: pseudo-likelihood = -25.17, time = 8.06s 
Iteration 11: pseudo-likelihood = -25.75, time = 8.95s 
Iteration 12: pseudo-likelihood = -25.93, time = 8.42s 
Iteration 13: pseudo-likelihood = -25.39, time = 8.30s 
Iteration 14: pseudo-likelihood = -25.30, time = 7.23s 
Iteration 15: pseudo-likelihood = -24.92, time = 8.59s 
Iteration 16: pseudo-likelihood = -25.58, time = 8.84s 
Iteration 17: pseudo-likelihood = -25.26, time = 8.11s 
Iteration 18: pseudo-likelihood = -25.30, time = 9.14s 
Iteration 19: pseudo-likelihood = -25.37, time = 8.47s 
Iteration 20: pseudo-likelihood = -25.35, time = 9.27s 
Training Time: 208.276484966 
Testing Time :0.0206489562988 
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5.2 Clustering Algorithms Results 
5.2.1 MeanShift Clustering 
 
Figure 35: Estimation and Recreation of 15 malware family and clusters after performing 
MeanShift Algorithm. 
 
Experiments with clustering algorithms were formed with the aim to recreate the dataset 
meaning that after all the samples have been shuffled by the algorithm, there was a hy-
pothesis to estimate the number of the clusters that are going to be created without know-
ing if there are the same groups that are presented to the problem. So, in the MeanShift 
algorithm, an estimation of 15 clusters is shown, a result that is considering not right or 
correct one as many of the samples probably have been assembled to malware families 
with entirely different features and behavior. The only thing that it is worth to be men-
tioned is that for the red cluster are two clusters but are not near each other, meaning that 
these samples have similarities even if may be in another malware family due to its dis-
tance from the Centre. It is not easy to say that the algorithm is not suitable for this pur-
pose, but it needs more investigation regarding the initial and default values  
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5.2.2 DBScan Clustering 
 
Figure 36: DBScan Algorithm’s Estimation of 20 malware families and clusters. 
DBScan made an estimation of 20 clusters. As a result, can be considered that it is near 
to the 25 clusters, but there is no clear explanation why the algorithm put the samples to 
other malware families. Again, more testing to the values of the algorithms can bring 
better results. The purple/red clusters are the biggest of all and that some samples are not 
so near each other so this is a potential miss clustering but also perhaps can be considered 
as a similarity between different malware families. Large circles are indicating core sam-
ples found by the algorithm. Smaller circles are non-core specimens that are still part of 
a cluster. Moreover, the outliers are shown by black points in figure 36. 
Estimated number of clusters: 20 
Homogeneity: 0.364 
Completeness: 0.875 
V-measure: 0.514 
Adjusted Rand Index: 0.176 
Adjusted Mutual Information: 0.357 
Silhouette Coefficient: 0.168 
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5.2.3 Kmeans and Minibatch Clustering 
 
Figure 37: 2 Means Clustering Results 
Using only K=2, the samples are equally classified for this dataset but again on blue clus-
tering some samples are not near each other something that happens to red clusters. So, 
this means that some fingerprints found to be more similar to samples for the blue cluster 
rather than red’s as they should be. Further investigation can show if they should be in 
the red as well or they are well clustered. Finally, more than K=2 clusters should be con-
sidered due to many malware samples that exist. 
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Figure 38: Comparison of Kmeans – MiniBatchKmeans 
Performing Kmeans and MiniBatchKmeans, shown how they treat this kind of a problem 
and what potential differences may have. On this dataset, they reacted the same as the 
compare between them shown differences for only three malware samples from the 
around 9000 that the Malimg dataset has so, to conclude, for this dataset using those al-
gorithms is the same. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Differences 
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6. Discussion 
This dissertation researched and aimed at studying the application of Machine Learning 
and Artificial Neural Network models to the task of detecting malware and malicious 
activities by classifying their samples into their malware families and presenting, visual-
izing and converting malware to images. The main principles of featuring and classifica-
tion in the case of supervised learning were stated. Datasets were introduced and pro-
cessed to perform malware detection. Numerical experiments were presented to validate 
the proposed approach. Machine Learning models performed well on Malimg dataset 
while having a very high training speed, with performances comparable to other malware 
detection solutions. Even though several efficient solutions have been developed to cope 
with malware and unknown attacks related to activities on the Internet, future versions of 
similar malware are expected to become more sophisticated and problematic. Infection 
media are likely to switch from networked computers to mobile phone terminals as in-
truders and attackers tend to be attracted to the systems that are the most widely used. 
Also, newly cloud networked environments are easy targets and should be designed 
properly to prevent their penetration by malicious software. Moreover, a way to tackle 
the malware and to be more certain the botnet problem would be to efficiently implement 
monitoring and filtering, which is difficult due to the diversity of the Internet and the lack 
of economic incentives for users and ISPs to protect devices and sites.  
On this dissertation’s research, malware is characterized based on image feature de-
scriptor. The performance proposed and presented for malware classification and cluster-
ing is promising.  Computer vision and machine-learning techniques for malware analysis 
will make progress for better and innovative methodologies to analyze malware. How-
ever, an image processing based methodology to analyze malware can easily be counter 
measured from an investigator, or a penetration tester, researcher or attacker that wants 
to secure or beat the system since this approach depends on global image features. Some 
countermeasures are moving segments in a binary or the addition of a large number of 
excessive information. Research for better feature extraction and processing patterns, 
which consider the distinct characteristics of malware executables, is needed to bypass, 
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defend and tackle against such attacks. A potential expansion is to divide the image re-
gions and characterize the local texture and spatial distribution of these texture patterns. 
So, feature engineering could and should become better, with more research to this field. 
Although clustering and classification are similar, the former is unsupervised, and the 
latter is supervised. 
For future, there is a need to improve the algorithms suggested or propose new ones. 
Discover new and better clustering algorithms, as malware analysis and detection field, 
is new and in a research mode now. Another approach on how malware can be visualized 
is the development of whole new visualization algorithms. So, an interesting approach 
could be to test the same dataset with the new transformations and other datasets as well. 
To conclude, this dissertation was to emphasize the importance for keeping investigating 
malware samples, their behavior and see how other algorithms work classification and 
clustering-wise. Malware day by day are made to bypass anti-viruses, firewalls and de-
tection systems, and there is a need to re-evaluate current approaches and rethink how to 
approach them. 
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Appendix 
Source Code 
1.Dataset Arrangement 
import os, glob, numpy 
os. chdir('/home/user/Desktop/malimg_dataset’) # the parent 
folder with sub-folders 
list_fams = os. listdir (os. getcwd ()) # vector of strings 
with family names 
no_imgs = [] # No. of samples per family 
for i in range(len(list_fams)): 
    os. chdir(list_fams[i]) 
    len1 = len(glob. glob('*.png')) # assuming the images are 
stored as 'png' 
    no_imgs.append(len1) 
    os. chdir ('..') 
 
total = sum(no_imgs) # total number of all samples 
y = numpy. zeros(total) # label vector 
 
temp1 = numpy.zeros(len(no_imgs) + 1) 
temp1[1: len(temp1)] = no_imgs 
temp2 = int(temp1[0]) # now temp2 is [0 no_imgs] 
for jj in range(len(no_imgs)): 
    temp3 = temp2 + int(temp1[jj + 1]) 
    for ii in range(temp2, temp3): 
        y[ii] = jj 
    temp2 = temp2 + int(temp1[jj + 1]) 
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2. Features Computation 
import Image, leargist 
 
X = numpy. zeros((sum(no_imgs), 320)) # Feature Matrix 
cnt = 0 
for i in range(len(list_fams)): 
    os.chdir(list_fams[i]) 
    img_list = glob. glob('*.png’) # Getting only 'png' files 
in a folder 
    for j in range(len(img_list)): 
        im = Image.open(img_list[j]) 
        im1 = im.resize((64, 64), Image.ANTIALIAS);  # for faster 
computation 
        des = leargist. color_gist(im1) 
        X[cnt] = des [0:320] 
        cnt = cnt + 1 
    os. chdir ('..') 
import random 
from sklearn. cross validation import StratifiedKFold 
from sklearn. utils import shuffle 
 
n_samples, n_features = X. shape 
p = range(n_samples) # an index array, 0: n_samples 
random. seed (random. random ()) 
random. Shuffle(p)  # the index array is now shuffled 
 
X, y = X[p], y[p] # both the arrays are now shuffled 
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kfold = 10 # no. of folds (better to have this at the start of 
the code) 
 
skf = StratifiedKFold (y, kfold) # indices='true' 
 
# Stratified KFold: This first divides the data into k folds. 
Then it also makes sure that the distribution of the data in 
each fold follows the original input distribution 
# Note: in future versions of scikit. learn, this module 
will be fused with kfold 
 
skfind = [None] * len(skf) # indices 
cnt = 0 
for train_index in skf: 
    skfind[cnt] = train_index 
    cnt = cnt + 1 
 
 
conf_mat = numpy. zeros((len(no_imgs), len(no_imgs))) # Ini-
tializing the Confusion Matrix 
 
n_neighbors = 1 # better to have this at the start of the code 
# 10-fold Cross Validation 
 
for i in range(kfold): 
    train_indices = skfind[i][0] 
    test_indices = skfind[i][1] 
    clf = [] 
    X_train = X[train_indices] 
    X_val = X[train_indices] 
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    y_train= y[train_indices] 
    y_val  = y[train_indices] 
    X_test = X[test_indices] 
    y_test = y[test_indices] 
 
3.Multilayer Perceptron with Theano-experiment that had some issues 
###########################################################
#################### 
# Training 
# Hyper-parameters. These were set by cross-validation, 
# using a GridSearchCV. Here not performing cross-validation 
to 
# save time. 
# More components tend to give better prediction performance, 
but larger 
# fitting time 
# Training RBM-Logistic Pipeline 
# Training Logistic regression 
 
import time 
import theano 
import theano. tensor as T 
import lasagne 
from lasagne. regularization import regular-
ize_layer_params_weighted, l2, l1 
import numpy as np 
import matplotlib. pyplot as plt 
from numpy import * 
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# Uses Lasagne to train a multi-layer perceptron, adapted 
from 
# http://lasagne.readthedocs.org/en/latest/user/tuto-
rial.html 
def lasagne_mlp (X_train, y_train, X_val, y_val, X_test, 
y_test, hidden_units=25, num_epochs=500, l2_param = 0.01, 
use_dropout=True): 
 
    # Prepare Theano variables for inputs and targets 
    input_var = T. tensor3('inputs') 
    target_var = T. ivector('targets') 
 
    print("Building model and compiling functions...") 
    # Input layer 
    network = lasagne. layers. InputLayer (shape= (None, 1, 400), 
                                     input_var=input_var) 
 
    
 if use_dropout: 
        # Apply 20% dropout to the input data: 
        network = lasagne. layers. DropoutLayer (network, p=0.2) 
 
    # A single hidden layer with number of hidden units as 
specified in the 
    # parameter. 
    l_hid1 = lasagne. layers. DenseLayer ( 
            network, num_units=hidden_units, 
            nonlinearity=lasagne. nonlinearities. rectify, 
            W=lasagne.init. GlorotUniform ()) 
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  if use_dropout: 
        # Dropout of 50%: 
        l_hid1_drop = lasagne. layers. DropoutLayer (l_hid1, 
p=0.5) 
        # Fully-connected output layer of 10 softmax units: 
        network = lasagne. layers. DenseLayer ( 
            l_hid1_drop, num_units=10, 
            nonlinearity=lasagne. nonlinearities. Softmax) 
    else: 
        # Fully-connected output layer of 10 softmax units: 
        network = lasagne. layers. DenseLayer ( 
            l_hid1, num_units=10, 
            nonlinearity=lasagne. nonlinearities. softmax) 
 
    
 # Loss expression for training 
    prediction = lasagne.layers.get_output(network) 
    loss = lasagne. objectives. categorical_crossentropy (pre-
diction, target_var) 
    loss = loss. mean () 
    # Regularization. 
    l2_penalty = lasagne. regularization. Regular-
ize_layer_params_weighted ({l_hid1: l2_param}, l2) 
    loss = loss + l2_penalty 
    # Update expressions for training, using Stochastic Gradi-
ent Descent. 
    params = lasagne.layers.get_all_params (network, traina-
ble=True) 
    updates = lasagne. updates. nesterov_momentum ( 
            loss, params, learning_rate=0.01, momentum=0.9) 
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    # Loss expression for evaluation. 
    test_prediction = lasagne.layers.get_output (network, de-
terministic=True) 
    test_loss = lasagne.objectives.categorical_crossen-
tropy(test_prediction, 
                                                            target_var) 
    test_loss = test_loss. mean () 
    # Expression for the classification accuracy: 
    test_acc = T. mean (T. eq (T. argmax (test_prediction, 
axis=1), target_var), 
                      dtype=theano.config. floatX) 
 
    # Compile a function performing a training step on a mini-
batch (by giving 
    # the updates dictionary) and returning the corresponding 
training loss: 
    train_fn = theano. function ([input_var, target_var], loss, 
updates=updates) 
 
    # Compile a second function computing the validation loss 
and accuracy: 
    val_fn = theano. function ([input_var, target_var], 
[test_loss, test_acc]) 
 
    # Finally, launch the training loop. 
    print ("Starting training...") 
    # Keep track of training and validation cost over the 
epochs 
    epoch_cost_train = np. empty (num_epochs, dtype=float32) 
    epoch_cost_val = np. empty (num_epochs, dtype=float32) 
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    #iterate over epochs: 
    for epoch in range(num_epochs): 
        # In each epoch,do a full pass over the training data: 
        train_err = 0 
        # want to keep track of the deterministic (feed-forward) 
        # training error. 
        train_err_ff = 0 
        train_batches = 0 
        start_time = time. time () 
        for batch in iterate_minibatches (X_train, y_train, 50, 
shuffle=True): 
            inputs, targets = batch 
            err, acc = val_fn(inputs, targets) 
            train_err_ff += err 
            train_err += train_fn(inputs, targets) 
 
            train_batches += 1 
 
 
        # And a full pass over the validation data: 
        val_err = 0 
        val_acc = 0 
        val_batches = 0 
        for batch in iterate_minibatches (X_val, y_val, 50, shuf-
fle=False): 
            inputs, targets = batch 
            err, acc = val_fn (inputs, targets) 
            val_err += err 
            val_acc += acc 
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            val_batches += 1 
 
        epoch_cost_train[epoch] = train_err_ff / train_batches 
        epoch_cost_val[epoch] = val_err / val_batches 
        # print the results for this epoch: 
        print ("Epoch {} of {} took {:.3f}s".format( 
            epoch + 1, num_epochs, time.time() - start_time)) 
        print("  training loss:\t\t{:.6f}".format(train_err / 
train_batches)) 
        print("  validation loss:\t\t{:.6f}".format(val_err / 
val_batches)) 
        print("  validation accuracy:\t\t{:.2f} %".format( 
            val_acc / val_batches * 100)) 
 
    
 # After training,compute and print the test error: 
    test_err = 0 
    test_acc = 0 
    test_batches = 0 
    for batch in iterate_minibatches(X_test, y_test, 50, shuf-
fle=False): 
        inputs, targets = batch 
        err, acc = val_fn(inputs, targets) 
        test_err += err 
        test_acc += acc 
        test_batches += 1 
    print("Final results:") 
    print("  test loss:\t\t\t{:.6f}".format(test_err / 
test_batches)) 
    print("  test accuracy:\t\t{:.2f} %".format( 
 -98- 
 
        test_acc / test_batches * 100)) 
    return epoch_cost_train, epoch_cost_val 
 
# This function was copied verbatim from the Lasagne tutorial 
at 
#http://lasagne.readthedocs.org/en/latest/user/tuto-
rial.html 
def iterate_minibatches (inputs, targets, batchsize, shuf-
fle=False): 
    assert len(inputs) == len(targets) 
    if shuffle: 
        indices = np. arange(len(inputs)) 
        np. random. shuffle(indices) 
    for start_idx in range (0, len(inputs) - batchsize + 1, batch-
size): 
        if shuffle: 
            excerpt = indices[start_idx:start_idx + batchsize] 
        else: 
            excerpt = slice(start_idx, start_idx + batchsize) 
        yield inputs[excerpt], targets[excerpt] 
 
 
epoch_cost_train, epoch_cost_val = lasagne_mlp(X_train, 
y_train, X_val, y_val, X_test, 
 y_test, hidden_units=800, num_epochs=500, l2_param=0, 
use_dropout=True) 
 
plt.style.use('bmh') 
plt. plot(range(len(epoch_cost_train)), epoch_cost_train, 
label="Training error") 
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plt. plot(range(len(epoch_cost_val)), epoch_cost_val, la-
bel="Validation error") 
 
plt. xlabel ("Num epochs") 
plt. ylabel("Cost") 
4.Multilayer Perceptron with Tensor Flow 
###########################################################
#################### 
# Training 
# Hyper-parameters. These were set by cross-validation, 
# using a GridSearchCV.Not performing cross-validation to 
save time. 
# More components tend to give better prediction performance, 
but larger fitting time 
# Training RBM-Logistic Pipeline 
# Training Logistic regression 
 
import tensorflow as tf 
import numpy as np 
 
# This function was copied verbatim from the Tensor Flow 
tutorial at 
# https://www.tensorflow.org/versions/master/tutorials/in-
dex.html 
def dense_to_one_hot (labels_dense, num_classes=10): 
    """Convert class labels from scalars to one-hot vec-
tors.""" 
    num_labels = labels_dense.shape[0] 
    index_offset = np. arange(num_labels) * num_classes 
    labels_one_hot = np. zeros ((num_labels, num_classes)) 
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    labels_one_hot. flat [index_offset + labels_dense. ravel 
()] = 1 
    return labels_one_hot 
 
# Adapted from the Tensor Flow tutorial at 
# https://www.tensorflow.org/versions/master/tutorials/in-
dex.html 
class DataSet(object): 
    def __init__ (self, images, labels): 
        assert images. shape [0] == labels. shape [0], ( 
            "images. shape: %s labels. shape: %s" % (images. 
shape, 
                                                   labels. 
shape)) 
        self. _num_examples = images. shape [0] 
        self. _images = images 
        self. _labels = labels 
        self. _epochs_completed = 0 
        self. _index_in_epoch = 0 
 
    @property 
    def images(self): 
        return self. _images 
 
    @property 
    def labels(self): 
        return self. _labels 
 
    @property 
    def num_examples(self): 
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        return self._num_examples 
 
    @property 
    def epochs_completed(self): 
        return self. _epochs_completed 
 
    def next batch (self, batch_size): 
        """Return the next `batch_size` examples from this 
data set.""" 
        start = self. _index_in_epoch 
        self. _index_in_epoch += batch_size 
        if self. _index_in_epoch > self. _num_examples: 
            # Finished epoch 
            self. _epochs_completed += 1 
            # Shuffle the data 
            perm = np. arange (self. _num_examples) 
            np. random. shuffle(perm) 
            self. _images = self. _images[perm] 
            self. _labels = self. _labels[perm] 
            # Start next epoch 
            start = 0 
            self._index_in_epoch = batch_size 
            assert batch_size <= self._num_examples 
        end = self._index_in_epoch 
        return self._images[start:end], self._la-
bels[start:end] 
 
 
def read_data_sets(train_images, train_labels, valida-
tion_images, validation_labels, test_images, test_labels): 
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    class DataSets(object): 
        pass 
 
    data_sets = DataSets () 
    data_sets. train = DataSet (train_images, 
dense_to_one_hot(train_labels)) 
    data_sets. validation = DataSet (validation_images, 
dense_to_one_hot(validation_labels)) 
    data_sets.test = DataSet (test_images, 
dense_to_one_hot(test_labels)) 
    return data_sets 
 
# Adapted from the Tensor Flow tutorial at 
#https://www.tensorflow.org/versions/master/tutorials/in-
dex.html 
def tensorFlowBasic (X_train, y_train, X_val, y_val, X_test, 
y_test): 
    sess = tf. InteractiveSession () 
    x = tf. placeholder ("float", shape= [None, 400]) 
    y_ = tf. placeholder ("float", shape= [None, 10]) 
    W = tf. Variable (tf. zeros ([400, 10])) 
    b = tf. Variable (tf. zeros ([10])) 
    sess.run (tf. initialize_all_variables()) 
    y = tf.nn. softmax (tf. matmul (x, W) + b) 
    cross_entropy = -tf. reduce_sum(y_ * tf.log(y)) 
    train_step = tf. train. GradientDescentOptimizer (0.01). 
minimize(cross_entropy) 
    mydata = read_data_sets (X_train, y_train, X_val, y_val, 
X_test, y_test) 
 
    for i in range (1000): 
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        batch = mydata. train. next_batch (50) 
        train_step.run (feed_dict= {x: batch [0], y_: batch 
[1]}) 
 
    correct_prediction = tf. equal (tf. argmax (y, 1), tf. 
argmax (y_, 1)) 
    accuracy = tf. reduce_mean (tf. cast (correct_predic-
tion, "float")) 
    return accuracy. eval (feed_dict= {x: mydata.test. im-
ages, y_: mydata.test. labels}) 
 
def weight_variable(shape): 
    initial = tf. truncated_normal (shape, stddev=0.1) 
    return tf. Variable(initial) 
 
def bias_variable(shape): 
    initial = tf. constant (0.1, shape=shape) 
    return tf. Variable(initial) 
def conv2d(x, W): 
    return tf.nn. conv2d (x, W, strides= [1, 1, 1, 1], pad-
ding='SAME') 
 
def max_pool_2x2(x): 
    return tf.nn.max_pool (x, ksize=[1, 2, 2, 1], 
                          strides= [1, 2, 2, 1], pad-
ding='SAME') 
def tensorFlowCNN (X_train, y_train, X_val, y_val, X_test, 
y_test, add_second_conv_layer=True): 
    x = tf. placeholder ("float", shape= [None, 400]) 
    y_ = tf. placeholder ("float", shape= [None, 10]) 
    sess = tf. InteractiveSession () 
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    # First Convolutional Layer 
    W_conv1 = weight_variable ([5, 5, 1, 32]) 
    b_conv1 = bias_variable ([32]) 
    x_image = tf. reshape (x, [-1, 20, 20, 1]) 
    h_conv1 = tf.nn. relu(conv2d(x_image, W_conv1) + 
b_conv1) 
    h_pool1 = max_pool_2x2(h_conv1) 
    if add_second_conv_layer: 
        # Second Convolutional Layer 
        W_conv2 = weight_variable ([5, 5, 32, 64]) 
        b_conv2 = bias_variable ([64]) 
        h_conv2 = tf.nn. relu (conv2d (h_pool1, W_conv2) + 
b_conv2) 
        h_pool2 = max_pool_2x2(h_conv2) 
 
        # Densely Connected Layer 
        W_fc1 = weight_variable ([5 * 5 * 64, 1024]) 
        b_fc1 = bias_variable ([1024]) 
        h_pool2_flat = tf. reshape (h_pool2, [-1, 5 * 5 * 
64]) 
        h_fc1 = tf.nn. relu (tf. matmul (h_pool2_flat, 
W_fc1) + b_fc1) 
    else: 
        # Densely Connected Layer 
        W_fc1 = weight_variable ([10 * 10 * 32, 1024]) 
        b_fc1 = bias_variable ([1024]) 
        h_pool1_flat = tf. reshape (h_pool1, [-1, 10 * 10 * 
32]) 
        h_fc1 = tf.nn. relu (tf. matmul (h_pool1_flat, 
W_fc1) + b_fc1) 
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        # Dropout 
    keep_prob = tf. placeholder("float") 
    h_fc1_drop = tf.nn. dropout (h_fc1, keep_prob) 
    # Softmax 
    W_fc2 = weight_variable ([1024, 10]) 
    b_fc2 = bias_variable ([10]) 
    y_conv = tf.nn. softmax (tf. matmul (h_fc1_drop, W_fc2) 
+ b_fc2)    
# Train the model 
    mydata = read_data_sets (X_train, y_train, X_val, y_val, 
X_test, y_test) 
    cross_entropy = -tf. reduce_sum (y_ * tf.log(y_conv)) 
    train_step = tf. train. AdamOptimizer(1e-4). mini-
mize(cross_entropy) 
    correct_prediction = tf. equal (tf. argmax (y_conv, 1), 
tf. argmax (y_, 1)) 
    accuracy = tf. reduce_mean (tf. cast (correct_predic-
tion, "float")) 
    sess.run (tf. initialize_all_variables ()) 
    for i in range (1000): 
        batch = mydata. train. next_batch (50) 
        if i % 100 == 0: 
            train accuracy = accuracy. eval (feed_dict= { 
                x: batch [0], y_: batch [1], keep_prob: 
1.0}) 
            print("step %d, training accuracy %g" % (i, 
train_accuracy)) 
        train_step.run (feed_dict= {x: batch [0], y_: batch 
[1], keep_prob: 0.5}) 
 
    return accuracy. eval (feed_dict= { 
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        x: mydata.test. images, y_: mydata.test. labels, 
keep_prob: 1.0}) 
accuracy = tensorFlowCNN (X_train, y_train, X_val, y_val, 
X_test, y_test) 
 
5. Multinomial Naive Bayes 
from sklearn. naive_bayes import MultinomialNB 
import time 
conf_mat = numpy. zeros((len(no_imgs), len(no_imgs))) # In-
itializing the Confusion Matrix 
n_neighbors = 1 # better to have this at the start of the 
code 
# 10-fold Cross Validation 
for i in range(kfold): 
    train_indices = skfind[i][0] 
    test_indices = skfind[i][1] 
    clf = [] 
    clf = MultinomialNB () 
    X_train = X[train_indices] 
    y_train = y[train_indices] 
    X_test = X[test_indices] 
    y_test = y[test_indices] 
 
 
    # Training 
    tic = time. time () 
    clf.fit (X_train, y_train) 
    toc = time. time () 
    print "training time= ", toc - tic # roughly 2.5 secs 
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    # Testing 
y_predict = [] 
tic = time. time () 
y_predict = clf. predict(X_test) # output is labels and not 
indices 
toc = time. time () 
print "testing time = ", toc - tic # roughly 0.3 secs 
6. DBScan Clustering Algorithm 
import time 
from sklearn. cluster import DBSCAN 
from sklearn import metrics 
import numpy as np 
from sklearn. preprocessing import StandardScaler 
conf_mat = numpy. zeros((len(no_imgs), len(no_imgs))) # Ini-
tializing the Confusion Matrix 
# Compute DBSCAN 
db = DBSCAN (eps=0.3, min_samples=10). fit(X) 
core_samples_mask = np. zeros_like (db. labels_, dtype=bool) 
core_samples_mask [db. core_sample_indices_] = True 
labels = db. labels_ 
# Number of clusters in labels, ignoring noise if present. 
n_clusters_ = len(set(labels)) - (1 if -1 in labels else 0) 
 
print ('Estimated number of clusters: %d' % n_clusters_) 
print ("Homogeneity: %0.3f" % metrics.homogeneity_score(y, 
labels)) 
print ("Completeness: %0.3f" % metrics.completeness_score(y, 
labels)) 
print ("V-measure: %0.3f" % metrics.v_measure_score(y, la-
bels)) 
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print ("Adjusted Rand Index: %0.3f" 
      % metrics. adjusted_rand_score (y, labels)) 
print ("Adjusted Mutual Information: %0.3f" 
      % metrics. adjusted_mutual_info_score (y, labels)) 
print ("Silhouette Coefficient: %0.3f" 
      % metrics. silhouette_score (X, labels)) 
7.Random Forest Classifier 
from sklearn. ensemble import RandomForestClassifier 
import time 
conf_mat = numpy. zeros((len(no_imgs), len(no_imgs)))  # Initial-
izing the Confusion Matrix 
n_neighbors = 1 # better to have this at the start of the code 
# 10-fold Cross Validation 
for i in range(kfold): 
    train_indices = skfind[i][0] 
    test_indices = skfind[i][1] 
    clf = [] 
    clf = RandomForestClassifier(n_estimators=10) 
    X_train = X[train_indices] 
    y_train = y[train_indices] 
    X_test = X[test_indices] 
    y_test = y[test_indices] 
         # Training 
    tic = time. time () 
    clf.fit (X_train, y_train) 
    toc = time. time () 
    print "training time= ", toc - tic # roughly 2.5 secs 
 
# Testing 
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y_predict = [] 
tic = time. time () 
y_predict = clf. predict(X_test) # output is labels and not 
indices 
toc = time. time () 
print "testing time = ", toc - tic # roughly 0.3 secs 
8.MeanShift Clustering 
import numpy as np 
from sklearn. cluster import MeanShift, estimate_bandwidth 
# Compute clustering with MeanShift 
# The following bandwidth can be automatically detected us-
ing 
bandwidth = estimate_bandwidth (X, quantile=0.3) 
ms = MeanShift (bandwidth= bandwidth) 
ms.fit(X) 
labels = ms.labelsy 
cluster_centers = ms. cluster_centersy 
 
labels_unique = np. unique(labels) 
n_clusters_ = len(labels_unique) 
 
print ("number of estimated clusters : %d" % n_clusters_) 
 
9.Kmeans-MiniBatch 
 
from sklearn. cluster import KMeans 
import numpy as np 
import matplotlib. pyplot as plt 
from sklearn. cluster import MiniBatchKMeans, KMeans 
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from sklearn. metrics.pairwise import pairwise_dis-
tances_argmin 
np. random. seed (0) 
batch_size = 45 
centers = [[1, 1], [-1, -1], [1, -1]] 
n_clusters = len(centers) 
k_means = KMeans (init='k-means++', n_clusters=3, n_init=10) 
t0 = time. time () 
k_means.fit(X) 
t_batch = time. time () - t0 
k_means_labels = k_means. labels_ 
k_means_cluster_centers = k_means. cluster_centers_ 
k_means_labels_unique = np. unique(k_means_labels) 
 
###########################################################
################### 
# Compute clustering with MiniBatchKMeans 
 
mbk = MiniBatchKMeans (init='k-means++', n_clusters=3, 
batch_size=batch_size, 
                      n_init=10, max_no_improvement=10, 
verbose=0) 
t0 = time. time () 
mbk.fit(X) 
t_mini_batch = time. time () - t0 
mbk_means_labels = mbk. labels_ 
mbk_means_cluster_centers = mbk. cluster_centers_ 
mbk_means_labels_unique = np. unique(mbk_means_labels) 
###########################################################
################### 
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# Plot result 
fig = plt. figure (figsize= (8, 3)) 
fig. subplots adjust (left=0.02, right=0.98, bottom=0.05, 
top=0.9) 
colors = ['#4EACC5', '#FF9C34', '#4E9A06'] 
# same colors for the same cluster from the 
# MiniBatchKMeans and the KMeans algorithm. Let's pair the 
cluster centers per closest one. 
order = pairwise_distances_argmin (k_means_cluster_centers, 
                                  mbk_means_cluster_cen-
ters) 
# KMeans 
ax = fig.add_subplot (1, 3, 1) 
for k, col in zip(range(n_clusters), colors): 
    my_members = k_means_labels == k 
    cluster_center = k_means_cluster_centers[k] 
    ax. plot (X [my_members, 0], X [my_members, 1], 'w', 
            markerfacecolor=col, marker='.') 
    ax. plot (cluster_center [0], cluster_center [1], 'o', 
markerfacecolor=col, 
            markeredgecolor='k', markersize=6) 
ax.set_title('KMeans') 
ax.set_xticks (()) 
ax.set_yticks (()) 
plt.text(-3.5, 1.8,  'train time: %.2fs\ninertia: %f' % ( 
    t_batch, k_means. inertia_)) 
ax = fig.add_subplot(1, 3, 2) 
for k, col in zip(range(n_clusters), colors): 
    my_members = mbk_means_labels == order[k] 
    cluster_center = mbk_means_cluster_centers[order[k]] 
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    ax. plot (X [my_members, 0], X [my_members, 1], 'w', 
            markerfacecolor=col, marker='.') 
    ax. plot (cluster_center [0], cluster_center [1], 'o', 
markerfacecolor=col, 
            markeredgecolor='k', markersize=6) 
ax.set_title('MiniBatchKMeans') 
ax.set_xticks (()) 
ax.set_yticks (()) 
plt.text (-3.5, 1.8, 'train time: %.2fs\ninertia: %f' % 
         (t_mini_batch, mbk. inertia_)) 
 
# Initialise the different array to all False 
different = (mbk_means_labels == 4) 
ax = fig.add_subplot (1, 3, 3) 
 
for l in range(n_clusters): 
    different += ((k_means_labels == k) != (mbk_means_labels 
== order[k])) 
 
identic = np. logical_not(different) 
ax. plot (X [identic, 0], X [identic, 1], 'w', 
        markerfacecolor='#bbbbbb', marker='.') 
ax. plot (X [different, 0], X [different, 1], 'w', 
        markerfacecolor='m', marker='.') 
ax.set_title('Difference') 
ax.set_xticks (()) 
ax.set_yticks (()) 
 
plt. show () 
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10. Comparison 
from sklearn import cluster, datasets 
from sklearn. neighbors import kneighbors_graph 
from sklearn. preprocessing import StandardScaler 
import time 
 
colors = np. array ([x for x in 
'bgrcmykbgrcmykbgrcmykbgrcmyk']) 
colors = np. hstack([colors] * 20) 
 
clustering_names = [ 
    'MiniBatchKMeans', 'AffinityPropagation', 'MeanShift', 
    'SpectralClustering', 'Ward', 'AgglomerativeCluster-
ing', 
    'DBSCAN', 'Birch'] 
 
plt. figure(figsize=(len(clustering_names) * 2 + 3, 9.5)) 
plt. subplots_adjust (left=.02, right=.98, bottom=.001, 
top=.96, wspace=.05, 
                    hspace=.01) 
 
plot_num = 1 
 
 
    # normalize dataset for easier parameter selection 
X = StandardScaler (). fit_transform(X) 
 
    # estimate bandwidth for mean shift 
bandwidth = cluster. estimate_bandwidth (X, quantile=0.3) 
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    # connectivity matrix for structured Ward 
connectivity = kneighbors_graph (X, n_neighbors=10, in-
clude_self=False) 
    # make connectivity symmetric 
connectivity = 0.5 * (connectivity + connectivity. T) 
 
    # create clustering estimators 
ms = cluster. MeanShift (bandwidth=bandwidth, bin_seed-
ing=True) 
two_means = cluster. MiniBatchKMeans(n_clusters=2) 
ward = cluster. AgglomerativeClustering (n_clusters=2, link-
age='ward', 
                                           connectiv-
ity=connectivity) 
spectral = cluster. SpectralClustering (n_clusters=2, 
                                          
eigen_solver='arpack', 
                                          affinity="near-
est_neighbors") 
dbscan = cluster. DBSCAN(eps=.2) 
affinity_propagation = cluster. AffinityPropagation (damp-
ing=.9, 
                                                       
preference=-200) 
 
average_linkage = cluster. AgglomerativeClustering ( 
        linkage="average", affinity="cityblock", n_clus-
ters=2, 
        connectivity=connectivity) 
 
birch = cluster. Birch(n_clusters=2) 
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clustering_algorithms = [ 
        two_means, affinity_propagation, ms, spectral, ward, 
average_linkage, 
        dbscan, birch] 
 
for name, algorithm in zip(clustering_names, clustering_al-
gorithms): 
        # predict cluster memberships 
    t0 = time. time () 
    algorithm.fit(X) 
    t1 = time. time () 
    if hasattr (algorithm, 'labels_'): 
        y_pred = algorithm. labels_.astype(np.int) 
    else: 
        y_pred = algorithm. predict(X) 
 
        # plot 
    plt. subplot (4, len(clustering_algorithms), plot_num) 
     
    plt. scatter (X[:, 0], X[:, 1], color=col-
ors[y_pred].tolist(), s=10) 
 
    if hasattr(algorithm, 'cluster_centers_'): 
        centers = algorithm.cluster_centers_ 
        center_colors = colors[:len(centers)] 
        plt.scatter(centers[:, 0], centers[:, 1], s=100, 
c=center_colors) 
    plt.xlim(-2, 2) 
    plt.ylim(-2, 2) 
    plt.xticks(()) 
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    plt.yticks(()) 
    plt.text(.99, .01, ('%.2fs' % (t1 - t0)).lstrip('0'), 
                transform=plt.gca().transAxes, size=15, 
                horizontalalignment='right') 
    plot_num += 1 
 
plt.show() 
 
 
    # normalize dataset for easier parameter selection 
11.Affinity Propagation 
from sklearn.cluster import AffinityPropagation 
from sklearn import metrics 
 
###########################################################
################### 
# Generate sample data 
centers = [[1, 1], [-1, -1], [1, -1]] 
 
###########################################################
################### 
# Compute Affinity Propagation 
af = AffinityPropagation(preference=-50).fit(X) 
cluster_centers_indices = af.cluster_centers_indices_ 
labels = af.labels_ 
 
n_clusters_ = n_clusters_ = len(set(labels)) - (1 if -1 in 
labels else 0) 
 
print('Estimated number of clusters: %d' % n_clusters_) 
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print("Homogeneity: %0.3f" % metrics.homogeneity_score(y, 
labels)) 
print("Completeness: %0.3f" % metrics.completeness_score(y, 
labels)) 
print("V-measure: %0.3f" % metrics.v_measure_score(y, la-
bels)) 
print("Adjusted Rand Index: %0.3f" 
      % metrics.adjusted_rand_score(y, labels)) 
print("Adjusted Mutual Information: %0.3f" 
      % metrics.adjusted_mutual_info_score(y, labels)) 
print("Silhouette Coefficient: %0.3f" 
      % metrics.silhouette_score(X, labels, metric='sqeu-
clidean')) 
###########################################################
################### 
# Plot result 
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt 
from itertools import cycle 
 
plt.close('all') 
plt.figure(1) 
plt.clf() 
colors = cycle('bgrcmykbgrcmykbgrcmykbgrcmyk') 
 
for k, col in zip(range(n_clusters_), colors): 
    class_members = labels == k 
    cluster_center = X[cluster_centers_indices[k]] 
    plt.plot(X[class_members, 0], X[class_members, 1], col 
+ '.') 
    plt.plot(cluster_center[0], cluster_center[1], 'o', 
markerfacecolor=col, 
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             markeredgecolor='k', markersize=14) 
    for x in X[class_members]: 
        plt.plot([cluster_center[0], x[0]], [cluster_cen-
ter[1], x[1]], col) 
 
plt.title('Estimated number of clusters: %d' % n_clusters_) 
plt.show() 
12.Perceptron 
from sklearn.linear_model import SGDClassifier 
import time 
 
conf_mat = numpy.zeros((len(no_imgs), len(no_imgs)))  # In-
itializing the Confusion Matrix 
 
n_neighbors = 1  # better to have this at the start of the 
code 
 
# 10-fold Cross Validation 
 
for i in range(kfold): 
    train_indices = skfind[i][0] 
    test_indices = skfind[i][1] 
    clf = [] 
    clf = SGDClassifier(loss='perceptron', eta0=1, learn-
ing_rate='constant', penalty=None) 
 
 
    X_train = X[train_indices] 
    y_train = y[train_indices] 
    X_test = X[test_indices] 
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    y_test = y[test_indices] 
 
    # Training 
    tic = time.time() 
    clf.fit(X_train, y_train) 
    toc = time.time() 
    print "training time= ", toc - tic  # roughly 2.5 secs 
 
    # Testing 
y_predict = [] 
tic = time.time() 
y_predict = clf.predict(X_test)  # output is labels and not 
indices 
toc = time.time() 
print "testing time = ", toc - tic  # roughly 0.3 secs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13.Support Vector Machines 
from sklearn import svm 
import numpy 
import time 
conf_mat = numpy.zeros((len(no_imgs), len(no_imgs)))  # In-
itializing the Confusion Matrix 
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n_neighbors = 1  # better to have this at the start of the 
code 
 
# 10-fold Cross Validation 
 
for i in range(kfold): 
    train_indices = skfind[i][0] 
    test_indices = skfind[i][1] 
    clf = [] 
    clf = svm.SVC() 
    X_train = X[train_indices] 
    y_train = y[train_indices] 
    X_test = X[test_indices] 
    y_test = y[test_indices] 
 
    # Training 
    tic = time.time() 
    clf.fit(X_train, y_train) 
    toc = time.time() 
    print "training time= ", toc - tic  # roughly 2.5 secs 
 
 
# Testing 
y_predict = [] 
tic = time.time() 
y_predict = clf.predict(X_test)  # output is labels and not 
indices 
toc = time.time() 
print "testing time = ", toc - tic  # roughly 0.3 secs 
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14.Stochastic Gradient 
from sklearn.linear_model import SGDClassifier 
import time 
conf_mat = numpy.zeros((len(no_imgs), len(no_imgs)))  # In-
itializing the Confusion Matrix 
 
n_neighbors = 1  # better to have this at the start of the 
code 
 
# 10-fold Cross Validation 
 
for i in range(kfold): 
    train_indices = skfind[i][0] 
    test_indices = skfind[i][1] 
    clf = [] 
    clf = SGDClassifier(loss="hinge", penalty="l2") 
          X_train = X[train_indices] 
    y_train = y[train_indices] 
    X_test = X[test_indices] 
    y_test = y[test_indices] 
 
 
    # Training 
    tic = time.time() 
    clf.fit(X_train, y_train) 
    toc = time.time() 
    print "training time= ", toc - tic  # roughly 2.5 secs 
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    # Testing 
y_predict = [] 
tic = time.time() 
y_predict = clf.predict(X_test)  # output is labels and not 
indices 
toc = time.time() 
print "testing time = ", toc - tic  # roughly 0.3 secs 
 
15.Decision Tree Algorithm 
 
from sklearn import tree 
import time 
conf_mat = numpy.zeros((len(no_imgs), len(no_imgs)))  # In-
itializing the Confusion Matrix 
n_neighbors = 1  # better to have this at the start of the 
code 
# 10-fold Cross Validation 
for i in range(kfold): 
    train_indices = skfind[i][0] 
    test_indices = skfind[i][1] 
    clf = [] 
    clf = tree.DecisionTreeClassifier() 
 
 
 X_train = X[train_indices] 
 y_train = y[train_indices] 
    X_test = X[test_indices] 
    y_test = y[test_indices] 
 
# Training 
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tic = time.time() 
clf.fit(X_train, y_train) 
toc = time.time() 
print "training time= ", toc - tic  # roughly 2.5 secs 
# Testing 
y_predict = [] 
tic = time.time() 
y_predict = clf.predict(X_test)  # output is labels and not 
indices 
toc = time.time() 
print "testing time = ", toc - tic  # roughly 0.3 secs 
 
16.Nearest Centroid Algorithm 
from sklearn.neighbors.nearest_centroid import NearestCen-
troid 
import time 
conf_mat = numpy.zeros((len(no_imgs), len(no_imgs)))  # In-
itializing the Confusion Matrix 
n_neighbors = 1  # better to have this at the start of the 
code 
# 10-fold Cross Validation 
for i in range(kfold): 
    train_indices = skfind[i][0] 
    test_indices = skfind[i][1] 
    clf = [] 
    clf = NearestCentroid() 
 
 
    X_train = X[train_indices] 
    y_train = y[train_indices] 
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    X_test = X[test_indices] 
    y_test = y[test_indices] 
 
    # Training 
    tic = time.time() 
    clf.fit(X_train, y_train) 
    toc = time.time() 
    print "training time= ", toc - tic  # roughly 2.5 secs 
 
# Testing 
y_predict = [] 
tic = time.time() 
y_predict = clf.predict(X_test)  # output is labels and not 
indices 
toc = time.time() 
print "testing time = ", toc - tic  # roughly 0.3 secs 
17. RBM Bernoulli Algorithm 
from sklearn.neural_network import BernoulliRBM 
from sklearn.pipeline import Pipeline 
from sklearn import linear_model 
from sklearn.pipeline import Pipeline 
import time 
conf_mat = numpy.zeros((len(no_imgs), len(no_imgs)))  # In-
itializing the Confusion Matrix 
 
n_neighbors = 1 # better to have this at the start of the 
code 
# 10-fold Cross Validation 
 
for i in range(kfold): 
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    train_indices = skfind[i][0] 
    test_indices = skfind[i][1] 
    clf = [] 
     
    logistic = linear_model.LogisticRegression() 
    rbm = BernoulliRBM(random_state=0, verbose=True) 
 
clf = Pipeline(steps=[('rbm', rbm), ('logistic', logistic)]) 
 
###########################################################
#################### 
# Training 
# Hyper-parameters. These were set by cross-validation, 
# using a GridSearchCV. not performing cross-validation to 
save time. 
rbm.learning_rate = 0.06 
rbm.n_iter = 20 
# More components tend to give better prediction performance, 
but larger fitting time 
rbm.n_components = 100 
 
 
# Training RBM-Logistic Pipeline 
# Training Logistic regression 
X_train = X[train_indices] 
y_train = y[train_indices] 
X_test = X[test_indices] 
y_test = y[test_indices] 
 
# Training 
 -126- 
 
tic = time.time() 
clf.fit(X_train, y_train) 
logistic_classifier = linear_model.LogisticRegres-
sion(C=100.0) 
logistic_classifier.fit(X_train, y_train) 
toc = time.time() 
print "training time= ", toc - tic  # roughly 2.5 secs 
# Testing 
y_predict = [] 
y_predict1=[] 
tic = time.time() 
y_predict = clf.predict(X_test) 
y_predict=logistic_classifier.predict(X_test)  # output is 
labels and not indices 
toc = time.time() 
print "testing time = ", toc - tic  # roughly 0.3 secs 
 
18. General print as computed matrix for results 
# Compute confusion matrix 
from sklearn.metrics import confusion_matrix 
cm = [] 
cm = confusion_matrix(y_test, y_predict) 
conf_mat = conf_mat + cm 
 
conf_mat = conf_mat.T  # since rows and  cols are inter-
changed 
avg_acc = numpy.trace(conf_mat) / sum(no_imgs) 
conf_mat_norm = conf_mat / no_imgs  # Normalizing the con-
fusion matrix 
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import matplotlib.pyplot as plt 
plt.imshow(conf_mat_norm, interpolation='nearest') 
plt.title('Confusion matrix') 
plt.colorbar() 
plt.show() 
plt.savefig('confusion_matrix.png') 
 
conf_mat2 = numpy.around(conf_mat_norm,decimals=2) # round-
ing to display in figure 
plt.imshow(conf_mat2,interpolation='nearest') 
for x in xrange(len(list_fams)): 
  for y in xrange(len(list_fams)): 
    plt.annotate(str(conf_mat2[x][y]),xy=(y,x),ha='cen-
ter',va='center') 
plt.xticks(range(len(list_fams)),list_fams,rota-
tion=90,fontsize=11) 
plt.yticks(range(len(list_fams)),list_fams,fontsize=11) 
plt.title('RandomForestClassifier') 
plt.colorbar() 
plt.show() 
plt.savefig('confusion_matrix.png') 
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